Recognizing Rights in Real Time: The Role of Google in the EU Right to Be Forgotten by Lee, Edward
Chicago-Kent College of Law 
Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law 
All Faculty Scholarship Faculty Scholarship 
2-2016 
Recognizing Rights in Real Time: The Role of Google in the EU 
Right to Be Forgotten 
Edward Lee 
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, elee@kentlaw.iit.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/fac_schol 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Edward Lee, Recognizing Rights in Real Time: The Role of Google in the EU Right to Be Forgotten, 49 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 1017 (2016). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/fac_schol/847 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons @ IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized 





Recognizing Rights in Real Time: 
The Role of Google in the EU Right 
to Be Forgotten 
Edward Lee* 
This Article analyzes the prominent role Google is playing in the 
development of the right to be forgotten (“RTBF”) in the European Union 
(“EU”). The Article conceptualizes Google’s role as a private 
administrative agency with quasi-lawmaking, quasi-adjudicative, and 
quasi-enforcement powers. My theory builds on several bodies of 
scholarship, including writings related to mixed administration in the 
United States, co-regulation in Europe, and global administrative law, as 
well as Weber’s theory of bureaucracy and Coase’s theory of the firm. The 
central insight of my theory of the private administrative agency is that 
corporations like Google may operate in a quasi-governmental, regulatory 
capacity in administering public rights on a global scale. 
While Google’s role raises concerns of democratic accountability, it also 
brings significant advantages in resources, efficiency, analytics, and 
flexibility that a public agency would not possess. In order to preserve 
these advantages, this Article proposes to keep intact much of Google’s 
independent decision-making in processing RTBF claims. But this Article 
calls for the creation of a hybrid agency (consisting of industry, 
government, and democratically elected representatives) to provide 
greater oversight to the entire process in the EU. The agency will create a 
standard webform for people to make RTBF requests with all search 
engines and will institute an administrative appellate body to resolve 
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conflicts among the search engines over the same RTBF claim. The 
proposed oversight agency represents a form of public-private partnership 
and global governance, designed to increase democratic accountability and 
transparency in Google’s implementation of the right to be forgotten. 
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“[Google] didn’t ask to be the decision maker.”1 
—Eric Schmidt, Google Chairman 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 13, 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(“CJEU”) decided a landmark case that has the potential to reshape 
the way in which Internet search engines — and possibly the Internet 
in general — operate.2 Prior to the decision, much of the Internet was 
designed on a de facto principle that the Internet never forgets.3 
Unlike print copies of newspapers, books, and other materials, much 
information published on the Internet has a shelf life of no end. 
Although a permanent, easy-to-access archive of nearly all information 
ever published has its virtues, it also has potential vices. When it 
comes to personal information, the Internet that never forgets may 
forever accentuate the worst or most embarrassing moments of a 
person’s life. Indeed, in some cases, the only information about a 
person that can be found by an Internet search may be the person’s 
most embarrassing or regrettable moment. Humans thus become 
defined by their past mistakes, failings, and scandals, but nothing else. 
Frailty, thy name is human. 
The CJEU’s decision in Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos may radically change the Internet that never 
forgets.4 The Court held that Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, as implemented by the 1995 EU Data 
Protection Directive, recognizes a right to be forgotten for individuals 
in the European Union (“EU”).5 The decision marks the first time the 
CJEU has recognized the right to be forgotten by name. This 
newfound right emanates from the EU Charter’s right of rectification 
in Article 8 and from the Directive’s Article 12(b) right of 
 
 1 Aoife White, Google EU Ruling Response Vetted as Complaints Pile Up, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 18, 2014, 6:04 AM) (internal quotation marks omitted), http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-18/google-eu-ruling-response-vetted-as-
complaints-pile-up. 
 2 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(AEPD) (Costeja), 2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131 (May 13, 2014). 
 3 See Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html; see also 
VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
50-91 (2009) (explaining how digital technology, storage, easy retrieval, and global 
span have led to the demise of forgetting). 
 4 Costeja, 2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131. 
 5 Id. ¶¶ 69–70, 91, 97. 
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“rectification, erasure or blocking of data the processing of which does 
not comply with the provisions of this Directive, in particular because 
of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data.”6 But the CJEU 
gave the right of rectification a more robust application specifically 
regarding Internet search engines. 
Under the Court’s ruling, individuals in the EU have a right to 
request search engines to remove, from search results for the 
individual’s name, links to web content that contains personal 
information about the individual that is “inadequate, irrelevant or 
excessive in relation to the purposes of the processing,” “not kept up 
to date,” or “kept for longer than is necessary.”7 In such cases, a 
person’s privacy interest trumps the search engine’s economic interest 
and the public’s interest in accessing the information.8 However, in 
other cases, the right to be forgotten may not justify the removal of 
links, such as if the person was a public figure and the general public’s 
interest in the information outweighs the right to be forgotten.9 These 
determinations are to be made on a case-by-case basis with each 
individual request. Moreover, importantly, the publisher of the 
underlying web content does not necessarily have an obligation to 
remove the article, so the content itself remains online (i.e. only the 
link to the article is removed from a search of the person’s name).10 
Besides outlining the general contours of the right, the CJEU’s 
decision is noticeably vague. For starters, what was the precise reason 
Mario Costeja González, the party in the case, was entitled to removal 
of the links to the articles?11 Was the information inaccurate? 
 
 6 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8, 2012 O.J. (C 
326) 391, 397–; Council Directive 95/46, art. 12(b), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 42 (EC) 
[hereinafter 1995 DP Directive]. 
 7 Costeja, 2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, ¶¶ 92, 94. 
 8 Id. ¶ 97. 
 9 Id. 
 10 See id. ¶¶ 85–88. 
 11 See id. ¶ 98 (“As regards a situation such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings, which concerns the display, in the list of results that the internet user 
obtains by making a search by means of Google Search on the basis of the data 
subject’s name, of links to pages of the on-line archives of a daily newspaper that 
contain announcements mentioning the data subject’s name and relating to a real-
estate auction connected with attachment proceedings for the recovery of social 
security debts, it should be held that, having regard to the sensitivity for the data 
subject’s private life of the information contained in those announcements and to the 
fact that its initial publication had taken place 16 years earlier, the data subject 
establishes a right that that information should no longer be linked to his name by 
means of such a list.”). 
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Inadequate? Excessive? Or just old? The CJEU did not say.12 
Ultimately, the CJEU left determinations of erasure requests to be 
decided on a case-by-case basis, presumably by the search engine or 
other entity receiving such a request.13 Moreover, the Costeja decision 
was issued after the EU Parliament had already begun debate on a new 
proposed Data Protection Regulation that will, if adopted, update the 
EU data privacy law, including a comprehensive, more detailed 
provision for a “[r]ight to be forgotten and to erasure.”14 The right to 
be forgotten is, in other words, still under development. 
Much of the crucial development has fallen to Google.15 The EU has 
left Google with the primary burden of operationalizing the right to be 
 
 12 See id. In practice, the members of the EU treat the decision of the CJEU as 
having precedential value. See, e.g., Vivian Grosswald Curran, Re-Membering Law in 
the Internationalizing World, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 102-03 (2005) (“[T]here is 
growing recognition of the precedential value of Court of Justice decisions even to 
factually dissimilar cases.”); Charles R. McGuire, The Constitution of the European 
Union: Content, Prospects and Comparisons to the U.S. Constitution, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 307, 325 (2005) (“EU law has been strengthened and extended by the ECJ, 
and it is clear that the precedent value of the ECJ decisions goes far beyond the usual 
weight given decisions in other European civil law courts.”). The CJEU itself 
sometimes treats its own decisions as precedents. See Karen McAuliffe, Precedent at the 
Court of Justice of the European Union: The Linguistic Aspect, in 15 LAW AND LANGUAGE: 
CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 2011, at 483, 483 (Michael Freeman & Fiona Smith eds., 2013). 
 13 The CJEU did not even specify that the search engine was to be the decision-
maker, although it was arguably implied by its analysis. See Costeja, 2014 EUR-Lex 
62012CJ0131, ¶ 94 (“Therefore, if it is found, following a request by the data subject 
pursuant to Article 12(b) of Directive 95/46, that the inclusion in the list of results 
displayed following a search made on the basis of his name of the links to web pages 
published lawfully by third parties and containing true information relating to him 
personally is, at this point in time, incompatible with Article 6(1)(c) to (e) of the directive 
because that information appears, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, to be 
inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to the purposes of the 
processing at issue carried out by the operator of the search engine, the information and 
links concerned in the list of results must be erased.” (emphasis added)). 
 14 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), at 51-53, COM (2012) 011 
final (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter General Data Protection Regulation], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52012PC0011. See generally Hunton & 
Williams LLP, European Parliament Adopts Draft General Data Protection Regulation; Calls 
for Suspension of Safe Harbor, PRIVACY & INFO. SECURITY L. BLOG (Mar. 12, 2014), 
https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2014/03/articles/european-parliament-adopts-draft-
general-data-protection-regulation-calls-suspension-safe-harbor/. 
 15 In 2015, in an unrelated corporate decision, Google restructured its business 
into a holding company called Alphabet with several other corporate entities, 
including Google as a wholly owned subsidiary that continues to operate the search 
engine. See Matt Rosoff, What Is Alphabet, Google’s New Company?, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 
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forgotten, as well as figuring out its contours. Though a for-profit 
corporation, Google is functioning similar to how a government 
agency or administrative body might act. Google has appointed an 
Advisory Council consisting of ten prominent professionals (eight 
from outside of Google) “to review input from dozens of experts in 
meetings across Europe, as well as from thousands of submissions via 
the Web,” in order to decide the contours of the right to be 
forgotten.16 On its website in EU countries, Google has set up a web 
form for individuals to request removal of links to content containing 
personal information of the requestor.17 Google has assigned staff to 
process and decide each request.18 Within six months of the CJEU 
decision, Google received over 160,000 removal requests and denied a 
majority (approximately 58%) of them.19 Google issues, on its website, 
a near real time “Transparency Report” detailing the number of 
requests, grants, and denials.20 It also submitted answers to the EU 
Article 29 Working Party’s inquiry about how the search engine was 
implementing the right to be forgotten thus far.21 In its answers, as 
well as in public statements from its officials, Google expressed its 
 
10, 2015, 5:01 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-alphabet-googles-new-
company-2015-8. Based on the initial accounts of the restructuring, it does not appear 
that it will change how Google processes RTBF requests. 
 16 See Google Advisory Council, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/advisorycouncil/ 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2015). 
 17 Search Removal Request Under Data Protection Law in Europe, GOOGLE, 
https://support.google.com/legal/contact/lr_eudpa?product=websearch&hl=en (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2015). 
 18 See Sam Schechner, Google Starts Removing Search Results Under Europe’s “Right 
to Be Forgotten,” WALL ST. J. (June 26, 2014, 3:28 PM ET), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/google-starts-removing-search-results-under-europes-right-to-be-forgotten-
1403774023 [hereinafter Google Removing Search Results] (“The company has hired a 
dedicated ‘removals team’ to evaluate each request[.]”). 
 19 See Matt McGee, Google: We Acted Quickly on Right to Be Forgotten Requests to 
Avoid Litigation, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Nov. 5, 2014, 1:45 PM), 
http://searchengineland.com/google-act-quickly-rtbf-requests-avoid-litigation-207431. 
 20 See Google Transparency Report: European Privacy Requests for Search Removals, 
GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/?hl=en 
(last visited Dec. 10, 2015). Because Google updates the report continuously, the 
numbers in the report appear to change as Google processes more requests. Given the 
constant updating, it may not be possible to verify from the webpage the numbers 
reported by Google on an earlier date. In reporting the numbers from Google’s 
webpage, this Article specifies the date on which the report was viewed. 
 21 Responding to Article 29 Working Party’s Questions, GOOGLE: EUR. BLOG (July 31, 
2014), http://googlepolicyeurope.blogspot.com/2014/07/responding-to-article-29-working-
partys.html. Microsoft and Yahoo were also asked to submit their answers to the EU 
questions. See infra note 147 and accompanying text. 
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difficulty in deciding the many requests without more guidance from 
the EU on how to balance the factors the CJEU briefly mentioned.22 
This Article examines the significant role that Google is playing in 
the development of the EU right to be forgotten and posits that Google 
is functioning like a private administrative agency. Google is not only 
implementing the CJEU’s right-to-be-forgotten decision, but it is also 
being asked to develop and define further (at least in the first instance) 
the contours of the right that the CJEU left ambiguous. Google is 
operating much like a government agency with numerous 
responsibilities, including quasi-lawmaking, quasi-adjudicative, and 
quasi-enforcement powers. Of course, EU government entities, 
especially the Article 29 Working Party, are providing oversight and 
guidance to the implementation of the right to be forgotten. But 
Google is a central player in this entire legal landscape. 
This Article asks whether such a role in implementing, developing, 
and deciding a fundamental right of privacy in the EU should fall to a 
for-profit corporation, such as Google.23 Part I analyzes the 
recognition of the EU right to be forgotten, focusing on how the 
CJEU’s decision in Costeja left Google with much of the responsibility 
in defining the right. Part II discusses how Google, along with the EU 
and national government entities, are operationalizing the right to be 
forgotten. Drawing upon the theory of Weber on bureaucracies and 
Coase on the firm, Part III develops the concept of the private 
administrative agency. This Part situates the private administrative 
 
 22 See Letter from Peter Fleischer, Global Privacy Counsel, to Isabelle Falque-
Pierrotin, Chair, Article 29 Working Party, at 4-5 (July 31, 2014) [hereinafter Letter 
from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin], available at https://docs.google.com/ 
a/kentlaw.iit.edu/file/d/0B8syaai6SSfiT0EwRUFyOENqR3M/preview (“Each criterion 
has its own potential complications and challenges . . . . We welcome the input of the 
Working Party both in identifying further areas where the balance of interests is 
particularly challenging, and in providing guidance on how to resolve those 
challenges in a just and consistent way.”); McGee, supra note 19 (“The terms of the 
ruling were vague . . . . There wasn’t guidance as to how we should implement it.” 
(quoting Peter Barron, head of Google’s European communications) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 23 This Article brackets the larger normative question on desirability of adopting the 
right to be forgotten. Critics especially from the United States have complained that the 
right impinges on the free speech and access to information. See generally Steven C. 
Bennett, The ‘Right to Be Forgotten’: Reconciling EU and US Perspectives, 30 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 161, 167-68 (2012); Craig Timberg & Sarah Halzack, Right to Be Forgotten vs. 
Free Speech, WASH. POST (May 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ 
technology/right-to-be-forgotten-vs-free-speech/2014/05/14/53c9154c-db9d-11e3-bda1-
9b46b2066796_story.html. I have proposed a limited, private right to be forgotten for 
Google to adopt as a matter of its own policy. See Edward Lee, The Right to Be Forgotten 
v. Free Speech, I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 18). 
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agency within the existing literature on mixed administration in the 
United States, co-regulation in Europe, and global administrative law. 
Building on this theory, Part IV contends that Google is operating as a 
private administrative agency in its development of the right to be 
forgotten. 
Part V analyzes the tradeoffs in delegating such a significant 
responsibility to Google, a for-profit corporation that is not subject to 
the kind of democratic accountability that government agencies 
commonly face. While noting several major concerns with the EU’s 
approach, this Part suggests that such delegation to Google has several 
important benefits, including gaining Google’s administrative ability to 
process efficiently thousands of requests (as it does in the copyright 
context for notice-and-takedown requests), its technical know-how in 
web design and analytics, and, perhaps most important of all, the 
greater flexibility and experimentation Google may enjoy in 
developing the right than a government agency would enjoy. Part VI 
offers several possible reforms to the process by which right-to-be-
forgotten requests are currently processed and decided. Key among the 
reforms are (i) the creation of a standard webform by which 
individuals can request delisting of links from all search engines of 
their choosing (e.g., Google, Bing, and Yahoo!) and (ii) the creation of 
a hybrid public/private agency comprised of representatives of the 
search engines, the EU government, and the public who would 
provide oversight to the entire process and who would act as an 
administrative appellate body to review conflicts among the search 
engines in their decisions of the same request. These reforms are 
meant to preserve the efficiencies and flexibilities of allowing 
corporations to process the right-to-be-forgotten claims in the first 
instance, while developing greater consistency and predictability in 
how such claims are decided as well as increasing transparency and 
democratic accountability. 
I. THE CJEU’S RECOGNITION OF THE EU RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 
This Part outlines the evolution of the right to be forgotten in the 
EU from its latent codification under the general right of rectification 
in the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive to its formal recognition in 
the context of Internet search engines by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in May 2014. Until the CJEU’s decision in 2014, it 
was not clear whether a “right to be forgotten” existed in the EU. Even 
after the decision, the precise contours of the right are still unclear. 
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A. The 1995 EU Data Protection Directive 
1. Legal Background 
In 1995, the EU Parliament and Council enacted an important 
directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data.24 The Data Protection Directive was the first of its 
kind anywhere in the world.25 It has influenced other countries in 
adopting comparable protections.26 The Directive established 
comprehensive requirements on how personal data can be processed 
that all EU members (currently 28 countries) must implement 
through their national laws.27 The EU considers the processing of 
personal data as a potential encroachment on the right to privacy, 
which is considered a fundamental right.28 
The data protection requirements are broad. They apply to any 
“controller” of personal data that falls within the scope of the Directive 
based on the controller’s establishment being located in an EU 
member.29 Article 2 defines “personal data,” “processing of personal 
data,” and “controller” in very broad terms.30 Personal data “shall 
mean any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person.”31 “Identifiable person” is defined broadly as well: “one who 
can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an 
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his 
physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social 
identity.”32 
Article 6(1) sets forth the five key principles that apply to the 
processing of personal data. First, “personal data must be . . . 
 
 24 1995 DP Directive, supra note 6. A directive does not have direct force of law on 
EU members. Each member must enact implementing law to carry out the obligations 
of the directive. See, e.g., id. art. 32, at 49-50 (ordering member states to “bring into 
force” the EU’s directive); see also Regulations, Directives and Other Acts, EUR. UNION, 
http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/legal-acts/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 
2015) (explaining difference between EU directives and regulations). 
 25 See International Privacy Issues, 23 INT’L HR J., no. 3, Summer 2014.  
 26 See Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data in Third 
Countries, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-
transfers/adequacy/index_en.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2015). 
 27 See International Privacy Issues, supra note 25; Commission Decisions on the 
Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data in Third Countries, supra note 26.  
 28 1995 DP Directive, supra note 6, preamble ¶¶ 10, 25, at 32-33. 
 29 Id. art. 4, at 39. 
 30 See id. art. 2(a)–(b), (d), at 39. 
 31 Id. art. 2(a). 
 32 Id. 
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processed fairly and lawfully.”33 Second, it must be “collected for 
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in 
a way incompatible with those purposes.”34 Third, personal data must 
be “adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for 
which they are collected and/or further processed.”35 Fourth, and 
important to the right to be forgotten, personal data must be “accurate 
and, where necessary, kept up to date.”36 Accordingly, “every 
reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data which are inaccurate 
or incomplete, having regard to the purposes for they were collected 
or for which they are further processed, are erased or rectified.”37 Fifth, 
personal data must be “kept in a form which permits identification of 
data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for 
which the data were collected or for which they are further 
processed.”38 
The fourth principle above provides the basis for a right of 
rectification in Article 12, which was one of the key provisions for the 
right to be forgotten later recognized in Costeja.39 Under Article 12, 
“every data subject” has “the right to obtain from the controller . . . as 
appropriate the rectification, erasure or blocking of data the processing of 
which does not comply with the provisions of this Directive, in 
particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data.”40 
The Directive establishes the Article 29 Working Party, which acts as 
an advisory body to the EU Commission.41 The Working Party consists 
of “a representative of the supervisory authority or authorities 
designated by each Member State and of a representative of the 
authority or authorities established for the Community institutions and 
bodies, and of a representative of the Commission.”42 One of the main 
responsibilities of the Working Party is to help ensure that the various 
EU countries are protecting personal data in a uniform manner, despite 
the fact that each country has its own data protection authority to 
oversee implementation of the Directive under its national laws.43 
 
 33 Id. art. 6(1)(a), at 40. 
 34 Id. art. 6(1)(b). 
 35 Id. art. 6(1)(c).  
 36 Id. art. 6(1)(d). 
 37 Id. (emphasis added). 
 38 Id. art. 6(1)(e). 
 39 See Case C-131/12, Costeja, 2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, ¶¶ 88, 94 (May 13, 2014). 
 40 1995 DP Directive, supra note 6, art. 12(a)–(b), at 42 (emphasis added). 
 41 Id. art. 29(1), at 48. 
 42 Id. art. 29(2). 
 43 See id. art. 30.  
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2. Internet Search Engines and Growth of Web Content 
When the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive was enacted, the 
World Wide Web was still in its infancy. Search engines were 
rudimentary. Google did not even exist. It was difficult for people to 
find relevant information on the Web without a lot of time, searching 
through false positive results, and trial and error. Google, founded in 
1998, revolutionized search engines with a highly accurate algorithm 
that indexed web pages based on the number of links from other web 
pages.44 Google soon became the most used search engine, in part 
because “googling” a search term usually produced links to relevant 
articles better than previous search technology.45 In short, Google 
helped people quickly find the information they wanted. 
Meanwhile, the amount of content online continued to grow 
exponentially. In 1995, only 23,500 websites existed.46 By 2005, the 
number grew to 60 million websites.47 By 2008, over 160 million.48 By 
2012, over 600 million.49 
This incredible growth of online content had a byproduct: the 
establishment of a permanent record or database of sorts that can store 
vast amounts of information — including personal information — 
forever. As the capacity of servers increased exponentially, there was 
practically no technological reason for people to take down or delete 
old information. The default became that all content, once posted, 
remains online unless the source affirmatively removes it. In popular 
parlance, “the Internet never forgets.” As Jeffrey Rosen recognized 
back in 2010: 
[T]he Internet records everything and forgets nothing . . . 
every online photo, status update, Twitter post and blog entry 
by and about us can be stored forever. With Web sites like 
LOL Facebook Moments, which collects and shares 
embarrassing personal revelations from Facebook users, ill-
 
 44 See DAVID A. VISE & MARK MALSEED, THE GOOGLE STORY 50-58 (2005). 
 45 See id. at 96. 
 46 How We Got from 1 to 162 Million Websites on the Internet, PINGDOM.COM (Apr. 4, 
2008), http://royal.pingdom.com/2008/04/04/how-we-got-from-1-to-162-million-websites-
on-the-internet/.  
 47 See id. 
 48 See id. 
 49 Total Number of Websites, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats. 
com/total-number-of-websites/#trend (last visited Feb. 23, 2015). 
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advised photos and online chatter are coming back to haunt 
people months or years after the fact.50 
The Internet that never forgets was in possible tension with the EU 
Data Protection Directive, especially its requirement allowing 
“identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the 
purposes for which the data were collected.”51 This tension remained 
latent for many years, however. Nearly twenty years passed before the 
issue was presented to the Court of Justice. 
B. The Costeja Case 
On March 5, 2010, a Spanish citizen named Mario Costeja González 
filed a complaint with Spain’s Data Protection Agency (Agencia 
Española de Protección de Datos or “AEPD”), which administers the EU 
Data Protection Directive in Spain.52 The complaint was against 
Google Spain, Google, and a Spanish newspaper La Vanguardia 
Ediciones SL.53 Costeja alleged that a Google search of his name 
resulted in links to two pages of La Vanguardia from January 19, 1998 
and March 9, 1998.54 The old posts included an announcement of a 
real estate auction of Costeja’s house, which was subject to attachment 
proceedings due to his failure to pay social security debts.55 Costeja 
claimed that the publication of these old posts violated his privacy 
rights under the Data Protection Directive because “the attachment 
proceedings . . . had been fully resolved for a number of years and that 
reference to them was now entirely irrelevant.”56 
The AEPD ruled in favor of Costeja, but only on his claim against 
Google Spain and Google: the newspaper was justified in posting the 
auction notice because “it took place upon order of the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs and was intended to give maximum publicity 
to the auction in order to secure as many bidders as possible.”57 
However, the AEPD required Google to remove access to the links to 
the old newspaper posts in searches of Costeja’s name, even “without it 
being necessary to erase the data or information from the website where 
 
 50 Rosen, supra note 3. 
 51 See 1995 DP Directive, supra note 6, art. 6(e), at 40. 
 52 Case C-131/12, Costeja, 2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, ¶¶ 14–17 (May 13, 2014). 
 53 Id. ¶ 14. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. ¶ 15. 
 57 Id. ¶ 16. 
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they appear.”58 The CJEU’s ruling created a split decision: the news 
articles containing the old information of Costeja’s debt did not violate 
the Data Protection Directive, but the Google search results of Costeja’s 
name that produced links to those articles did.59 
Upon appeal, Spain’s National High Court referred to the CJEU 
several questions related to the interpretation of the 1995 Directive 
and its application to search engines.60 On May 13, 2014, the CJEU 
rendered its landmark decision, which agreed with the AEPD’s ruling 
and explicitly referred to Costeja’s argument that the fundamental 
rights of privacy and data protection include “the right to be 
forgotten,” although the CJEU did not use the term beyond that 
reference.61 
In the key part of its decision, the CJEU ruled: 
[T]he supervisory authority or judicial authority may order 
the operator of the search engine to remove from the list of 
results displayed following a search made on the basis of a 
person’s name links to web pages published by third parties 
containing information relating to that person, without an 
order to that effect presupposing the previous or simultaneous 
removal of that name and information — of the publisher’s 
own accord or following an order of one of those authorities 
— from the web page on which they were published.62 
The CJEU based its holding on the right of “rectification, erasure or 
blocking of data” under Article 12(b) of the Data Protection Directive, 
as well as Article 14(a).63 The CJEU rejected Google’s and Austria’s 
arguments that a party invoking the right of rectification should go first 
to the publisher of the information to seek its removal or should obtain 
a determination that the information is unlawful or incomplete before 
 
 58 Id. ¶ 17. 
 59 See id. ¶¶ 86–88, 98–99. 
 60 Id. ¶¶ 18–20. 
 61 Id. ¶¶ 91, 94. Some have suggested that the right to be forgotten has historical 
antecedents in nineteenth century dueling codes and laws in Europe, which enabled 
people to defend their honor (such as from embarrassing facts) by challenging another 
person to a duel. See, e.g., Tom Gara, The Origins of the ‘Right to be Forgotten’: Sir, I 
Demand a Duel, WALL ST. J. BLOG (May 14, 2014, 4:00 PM ET), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/corporate-intelligence/2014/05/14/the-origins-of-the-right-to-be-
forgotten-sir-i-demand-a-duel/; Caroline Winter, Dueling Gives Way to ‘Right to Be 
Forgotten’ on Google, SFGATE (May 18, 2014, 4:10 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/ 
technology/article/Dueling-gives-way-to-right-to-be-forgotten-on-5487814.php. 
 62 Costeja, 2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, ¶ 82. 
 63 Id. ¶¶ 70, 88. 
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approaching a search engine.64 The CJEU explained that a search engine 
itself performs the processing of personal data that is distinct from the 
publisher.65 Moreover, the CJEU believed that requiring search engines 
to remove links may be a more effective way to protect privacy rights, 
“given the ease with which information published on a website can be 
replicated on other sites and the fact that the persons responsible for its 
publication are not always subject to [EU] legislation.”66 The CJEU also 
indicated that a search engine and a publisher may have different 
interests and possible exemptions (e.g., a publisher may have an 
exemption for publishing information “solely for journalistic purposes” 
under Article 9) in deciding whether to accept a person’s claim of a right 
of rectification under Article 12(b).67 
Underlying the CJEU’s decision is a sense of the sheer power that 
search engines like Google wield in the information age: 
Indeed, since the inclusion in the list of results, displayed 
following a search made on the basis of a person’s name, of a 
web page and of the information contained on it relating to 
that person makes access to that information appreciably easier 
for any internet user making a search in respect of the person 
concerned and may play a decisive role in the dissemination of 
that information, it is liable to constitute a more significant 
interference with the data subject’s fundamental right to 
privacy than the publication on the web page.68 
The CJEU highlighted the “decisive role” search engines play in 
enabling personal data to be found on the Internet.69 Search engines 
have the power to create a personal profile based on the aggregation of 
disparate pieces of information about a person: 
[T]hat processing enables any internet user to obtain through 
the list of results a structured overview of the information 
relating to that individual that can be found on the internet — 
information which potentially concerns a vast number of 
aspects of his private life and which, without the search 
engine, could not have been interconnected or could have 
 
 64 See id. ¶¶ 63–64. 
 65 See id. ¶ 83. 
 66 Id. ¶ 84. 
 67 Id. ¶¶ 85–86. 
 68 Id. ¶ 87 (emphasis added). 
 69 Id. ¶¶ 36–38. 
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been only with great difficulty — and thereby to establish a 
more or less detailed profile of him.70 
Given the power that search engines hold, “the effect of the 
interference with those rights of the data subject is heightened on 
account of the important role played by the internet and search 
engines in modern society, which render the information contained in 
such a list of results ubiquitous.”71 
C. What Costeja Leaves Unclear 
Despite its importance in recognizing a right to be forgotten, the 
Costeja decision is noticeably vague on what this right entails. For 
starters, it is not clear what made the links to the old posts about 
Costeja’s debt in violation of the Directive. Was it based simply on the 
fact that the posts contained personal information that was sixteen 
years old? If so, could the violation be rectified with a notice that 
indicated the final successful resolution of Costeja’s debt? Of course, 
as an institution, the CJEU only interprets and decides the meaning of 
EU law; it does not actually rule on the particular facts of a case 
(although the outcome of the case was clearly suggested in the CJEU’s 
decision).72 In Costeja, the CJEU all but ruled that there was a 
violation even without fully explaining what the reason for the 
violation was: 
[I]t should be held that, having regard to the sensitivity for the 
data subject’s private life of the information contained in those 
announcements and to the fact that its initial publication had 
taken place 16 years earlier, the data subject establishes a right 
that that information should no longer be linked to his name 
by means of such a list. Accordingly, since in the case in point 
there do not appear to be particular reasons substantiating a 
preponderant interest of the public in having, in the context of 
such a search, access to that information, a matter which is, 
however, for the referring court to establish, the data subject may, 
by virtue of Article 12(b) and subparagraph (a) of the first 
paragraph of Article 14 of Directive 95/46, require those links to 
be removed from the list of results.73 
 
 70 Id. ¶ 80. 
 71 Id.  
 72 See id. ¶ 98. 
 73 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Even beyond the particular dispute involving Costeja, the CJEU left 
many of the contours of the right to be forgotten for future 
elaboration, apparently on a case-by-case basis. A search engine must 
remove links in the following situation: 
[I]f it is found, following a request by the data subject . . . that 
the inclusion in the list of results displayed following a search 
made on the basis of his name of the links to web pages 
published lawfully by third parties and containing true 
information relating to him personally is, at [that] point in 
time, incompatible with Article 6(1)(c) to (e) of the directive 
because that information appears, having regard to all the 
circumstances of the case, to be inadequate, irrelevant or no 
longer relevant, or excessive in relation to the purposes of the 
processing at issue carried out by the operator of the search 
engine . . . .74 
The CJEU clarified that the personal information does not have to 
cause prejudice to the individual in order to establish a right of 
erasure75 and that, “as a rule,” the privacy interests of the individual 
outweigh the search engine’s economic interest and the public’s 
interest in finding the information.76 However, despite characterizing 
its approach as a “rule,” the CJEU also noted that the right to be 
forgotten is subject to the balancing of public’s interest in the 
information. Removal of links would not be warranted “if it 
appeared . . . such as [by] the role played by the data subject in public 
life, that the interference with his fundamental rights is justified by the 
preponderant interest of the general public in having, on account of 
inclusion in the list of results, access to the information in question.”77 
The latter part of the CJEU’s explanation appeared to make its 
approach less of a rule and more of a standard, requiring case-by-case 
analysis.78 And, for Costeja, in an ironic and perhaps cruel twist, the 
Spanish data protection authority later ruled that his right to be 
forgotten did not extend to recent negative comments published 
 
 74 Id. ¶ 94 (emphasis added). 
 75 Id. ¶ 96. 
 76 Id. ¶ 97. 
 77 Id. 
 78 There is extensive literature on rules versus standards. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, 
Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (analyzing the 
costs of promulgating a rule versus a standard); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance 
in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687-713 (1976) (discussing 
differences between rules and standards). 
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online regarding his court victory, given the public interest in the 
decision.79 
II. OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN IN REAL TIME 
One of the most important parts of the Costeja decision is what it 
does not say: how to operationalize or put into practice, in the EU, a 
procedure and a set of criteria for determining claims invoking the 
right to be forgotten in search engine results. Part II explains how the 
primary responsibility fell not upon government actors or agencies, 
but upon Google. 
A. The Role of Google 
The ambiguities of the right to be forgotten left open by the Costeja 
decision begs the question: what institution should have the primary 
responsibility of addressing or clearing up those ambiguities? The Data 
Protection Authorities or national courts of EU members would seem to 
be logical choices. As it has turned out, however, the primary 
responsibility has fallen to Google to figure out the contours of the right 
to be forgotten. Google has played a defining role in operationalizing 
the right to be forgotten and deciding what circumstances warrant a 
removal of a link to personal information or not. Other search engines, 
such as Yahoo! and Bing, have also played a part, but they have not 
(yet) been as prominent in the public debate related to the 
implementation of the right — perhaps because, in Oct. 2014, Google 
had over 92% market share for searches in Europe, followed by Bing at 
2.67% and Yahoo! at 2.34%.80 Given Google’s dominance in users and 
market share for search, its decisions may have a greater impact than 
other search engines’ decisions for their sites. 
1. Google Is Delegated Much Authority 
Perhaps the most striking thing about how the contours of the right 
to be forgotten are being developed in the EU is that the primary 
responsibility in the first instance has fallen to the search engines, 
 
 79 Miquel Peguera, No More Right-to-Be-Forgotten for Mr. Costeja, Says Spanish Data 
Protection Authority, STAN. CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Oct. 3, 2015, 8:24 AM), 
https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/10/no-more-right-be-forgotten-mr-costeja-says-
spanish-data-protection-authority. 
 80 See Matt Rosoff, Here’s How Dominant Google Is in Europe, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 
29, 2014, 2:38 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-how-dominant-google-is-
in-europe-2014-11 [hereinafter Google in Europe] (citing StatCounter). 
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especially Google. One could easily envision a different procedure: the 
Data Protection Authority (“DPA”) in each EU member would receive 
the initial request from an individual invoking the right to be 
forgotten, and the DPA would determine whether the claim was valid. 
If it was, the DPA would then render a decision and order the search 
engine to remove the link to the web post. 
But that’s not what happened after Costeja. Instead, the procedure 
fell directly on the search engines to process and decide RTBF claims 
made by individuals.81 Given the minimal guidance in the Costeja 
decision, considerable discretion and authority were delegated, in 
effect, to Google to develop the RTBF on a case-by-case basis.82 Of 
course, Google’s decisions can still be appealed to the national Data 
Protection Authorities or courts.83 But the important first analysis of 
each claim falls upon Google, which may be the sole arbiter of the vast 
majority of claims if there are few appeals.84 
Some critics have openly questioned and criticized the power 
Google has attained in this process. European Parliament Member Jan 
Philipp Albrecht argued that Google should not be making “these 
decisions without some sort of independent oversight,” and he 
suggested that the proposed amendment to the EU’s data protection 
law include such a requirement.85 The United Kingdom House of 
Lords’ Home Affairs, Health and Education EU Subcommittee went 
even further, declaring: 
[W]e . . . believe that it is wrong in principle to leave search 
engines themselves the task of deciding whether to delete 
information or not, based on vague, ambiguous and unhelpful 
criteria, and we heard from witnesses how uncomfortable they 
are with the idea of a commercial company sitting in judgment 
on issues like that.86 
 
 81 See infra Part IV.B. 
 82 See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text. 
 83 See 1995 DP Directive, supra note 6, art. 22, at 45 (recognizing judicial remedy 
as a requirement to protect privacy in addition to any administrative remedy EU 
members establish). Each EU member has its own data protection authority. See 
European Union, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/bodies/ 
authorities/eu/index_en.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2015). 
 84 See infra Part II.A.2. 
 85 Jennifer Baker, Right to Be forgotten? That’s Not Google’s Call — Data MEP 
Albrecht, REGISTER (Jan. 7, 2015, 4:59 PM) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/01/07/right_to_be_forgotten_not_google_call_data
_mep_albrecht/. 
 86 Alex Hern, Lords Describe Right to Be Forgotten as ‘Unworkable, Unreasonable, and 
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Even Google Chairman Eric Schmidt questioned leaving the 
responsibility to Google to decide the requests and remarked publicly 
that Google “didn’t ask to be the decision maker.”87 His sentiment was 
echoed by Google European Communications Director Peter Barron, 
who stated: “[Google] never expected or wanted to make . . . [these] 
complicated decisions that would in the past have been extensively 
examined in the courts, [but are] now being made by scores of lawyers 
and paralegal assistants [at Google].”88 Nonetheless, the primary 
responsibility of operationalizing and determining the RTBF has fallen 
on Google. If Google shirked its responsibility, it could face 
substantial fines.89 
2. Google Establishes an Administrative Procedure for Filing and 
Deciding RTBF Claims 
Based upon its interpretation of Costeja and exercising the 
considerable discretion it affords, Google implemented the decision in 
the following way as depicted in Figure 1. From the outset, Google 
acknowledged that its process is a work-in-progress and will evolve 
“as data protection authorities and courts issue guidance and as we all 
learn through experience.”90 
 
 
Wrong,’ GUARDIAN (July 30, 2014, 4:56 AM EDT) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/30/lords-right-to-be-forgotten-ruling-
unworkable. 
 87 White, supra note 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 88 Julia Powles, Google Says It Acknowledges Some People Want ‘Right to Be 
Forgotten,’ GUARDIAN (Feb. 19, 2015, 11:09 EST) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/19/google-acknowledges-some-
people-want-right-to-be-forgotten. 
 89 See, e.g., Owen Bowcott & Kim Willsher, Google’s French Arm Faces Daily €1,000 
Fines over Links to Defamatory Article, GUARDIAN (Nov. 13, 2014, 7:53 EST), http:// 
www.theguardian.com/media/2014/nov/13/google-french-arm-fines-right-to-be-forgotten. 
If a proposed EU data protection regulation is passed, the fines could ranges up to 5% of a 
company’s global revenue. See Julia Fioretti, Firms to Face Stiffer Fines for Breaking EU’s 
“Right to Be Forgotten” Rules, REUTERS (May 20, 2015, 1:28 PM EDT), http:// 
www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/20/eu-dataprotection-fines-idUSL5N0YB23320150520. 
 90 See Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 1. 
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Figure 1. Google’s Adjudication of RTBF Claims 
 
First, Google set up a webform — available in twenty-five languages 
— for people invoking the RTBF in the EU to request the removal of 
links to posts containing their personal data.91 The webform was 
launched by May 30, 2014, (nearly) within two weeks of the Costeja 
decision.92 The webform provides detailed instructions and asks each 
person to provide the following information: (1) the country whose 
law applies “among the laws of the EU and EFTA Member States”; (2) 
personal information including the name used to search and full name 
of requester; and (3) the specific URLs the requester wants removed 
from the list of results when searching for the person’s name and “[a]n 
explanation, for each URL, as to how the linked web page is related to 
the requester or the person represented by him/her” and “how the 
inclusion of this URL as a search result is irrelevant, outdated, or 
otherwise objectionable.”93 To substantiate the request, each person 
must submit a copy of a document verifying his or her identity and 
 
 91 Id. at 2-3, 6; Search Removal Request Under Data Protection Law in Europe, supra 
note 17. 
 92 Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 11. 
 93 Id. at 2-3. 
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check a box attesting to the accuracy of the representations made.94 
Google does not provide an alternative process for RTBF claims.95 Yet 
it has on an ad hoc basis processed some claims submitted by fax, 
letter, or email.96 
Second, Google hired and assigned staff — a so-called “removals 
team” — to process the requests.97 Although the precise number of 
employees has not been revealed, it was somewhere under 100 
employees (including paralegal assistants and other employees) in 
November 2014.98 As Google explained, “We have many people 
working full time on the process, and ensuring enough resources are 
available for the processing of requests required a significant hiring 
effort.”99 
In evaluating the requests, Google staff “will look at whether the 
search results in question include outdated or irrelevant information 
about the data subject, as well as whether there’s a public interest in 
the information.”100 Google considers several criteria, including: 
(1) “the individual (for example, whether an individual is a 
public figure),” 
(2) “the publisher of the information (for example, whether 
the link requested to be removed points to material published 
by a reputable news source or government website),” and 
(3) “the nature of the information available via the link (for 
example, if it is political speech, if it was published by the data 
subject him- or herself, or if the information pertains to the 
data subject’s profession or a criminal conviction).”101 
Google acknowledges, however, that “[e]ach criterion has its own 
potential complications and challenges.”102 What is striking about 
Google’s nonexhaustive list of criteria is that many of the factors do 
not come explicitly from the CJEU’s decision. While the CJEU did 
 
 94 Id. at 3. 
 95 Id. at 7 (“We are not providing an alternative process for submitting a removal 
request but we have received requests in writing by fax, letter and email.”). 
 96 Id. (“We generally refer these requests to the webform. However, if a requester 
insists on not using the webform, we will nevertheless process his/her request.”). 
 97 See Schechner, Google Removing Search Results, supra note 18. 
 98 See McGee, supra note 19. 
 99 See Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 10. 
 100 Id. at 4. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
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mention public figures as a factor that militate against a RTBF claim,103 
the Court did not discuss any of the other criteria now used by 
Google.104 The Court spoke generally about “the preponderant interest 
of the general public in having . . . access to the information in 
question.”105 But Google has developed more specific criteria 
apparently based on its own interpretation of the general guidance 
provided by the CJEU. 
The Google staff — lawyers, paralegals, and engineers primarily 
located in Dublin, Ireland, Google’s European headquarters — decide 
each request balancing the factors on a case-by-case basis.106 In some 
cases, Google requests more information from the requester before a 
decision can be made.107 Google lawyers reportedly meet twice a week 
with the team to try to ensure consistent decisions.108 The removals 
team of Google staff decides the easy cases. In close cases, striking the 
right balance can be difficult. Google set up a senior Google panel 
consisting of “senior lawyers, engineers and product managers” who 
meet typically on Wednesdays to deliberate on and decide the difficult 
cases by a vote of the panelists.109 Participants of the senior panel can 
appear in person or through video via Google hangouts.110 Sometimes 
the senior Google panel calls in an outside expert for input.111 
If the claim is rejected, Google sends a rejection notice indicating 
the reason — for example, “political speech, public interest” — and 
 
 103 Case C-131/12, Costeja, 2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, ¶¶ 97, 99 (May 13, 2014). 
 104 Compare id. ¶ 81 (“Whilst it is true that the data subject’s rights protected by 
those articles also override, as a general rule, that interest of internet users, that 
balance may however depend, in specific cases, on the nature of the information in 
question and its sensitivity for the data subject’s private life and on the interest of the 
public in having that information, an interest which may vary, in particular, according 
to the role played by the data subject in public life.”), with supra text accompanying 
note 100 (listing relevant factors considered by Google, including (1) the individual 
(e.g., public figure); (2) the publisher (e.g., government website); and (3) the nature 
of the information (e.g., political speech)). 
 105 Costeja, 2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, ¶ 97. 
 106 See Lisa Fleisher & Sam Schechner, How Google’s Top Minds Decide What to 
Forget, WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2015, 4:20 PM ET), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-
googles-top-minds-decide-what-to-forget-1431462018. 
 107 See Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 5. 
 108 See Jeffrey Toobin, The Solace of Oblivion, NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/solace-oblivion. 
 109 See Fleisher & Schechner, supra note 106. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
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the right of the requester to appeal the decision to the national Data 
Protection Authority.112 
If the claim for removal is accepted, Google sends the requester a 
notice indicating the removal of the URL.113 Google also sends a notice 
of the URLs removed to any webmaster who signed up on Google’s 
service to receive notices when URLs from their sites are removed 
from search results for legal reasons.114 Google’s notices to the affected 
webmaster do not disclose the personal data or the person who 
requested the delisting.115 Google made the policy decision to notify 
webmasters based on its understanding that such notices do not 
contain personal data and, even if hypothetically they do contain 
personal data, Google would be justified in sending notices to affected 
webmasters under Article 7(c) and (f) of the Data Protection 
Directive.116 In addition, for removed listings related to nonpublic 
figures, Google places “a notification at the bottom of all search result 
pages for queries where a name-based removal has occurred as well as 
for all other search result pages that appear to be for the name of a 
person, indicating that results may have been removed.”117 For 
example, searching the name “George Osborne” on Google.co.uk 
yields a notification informing the user that “[s]ome results may have 
been removed under data protection law in Europe.”118 Google 
decided not to show this notice for public figures or celebrities 
because “such searches are very rarely affected by a removal, due to 
the role played by these persons in public life.”119 
Another key interpretation by Google was to limit the application of 
Costeja to the European versions of Google services (web search, 
image search, and Google News).120 Google has national versions (e.g., 
Google.fr for France) for nearly every country.121 If European users 
access the U.S. version Google.com, they will be redirected to the 
 
 112 Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 5. 
 113 Id.  
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 6. 
 117 Id. at 10. 
 118 Online search for “George Osborne,” https://www.google.co.uk/#q=george+ 
osborne (last visited Aug 19, 2015) (search “George Osborne”; then scroll to bottom 
of search results on first page). See generally Danny Sullivan, How Google’s New “Right 
to Be Forgotten” Form Works: An Explainer, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (May 30, 2014, 2:54 
AM), http://searchengineland.com/google-right-to-be-forgotten-form-192837. 
 119 Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 10. 
 120 See id. at 3-4, 10. 
 121 Id. at 3-4. 
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relevant European version (unless a virtual private network masks the 
geolocation of the user).122 According to Google, “[f]ewer than 5% of 
European users use google.com,” a figure that Google claims is 
comprised of a significant number of travelers.123 In November 2014, 
the Article 29 Working Party disagreed with Google’s approach and 
issued guidelines that would require search engines to remove links 
on all of their domains, including Google.com.124 
Google has reversed some removal decisions, apparently on an ad 
hoc basis and after some public scrutiny.125 But Google appears to 
provide an individual no way to request reconsideration or an appeal 
within Google once it has reached its decision.126 
3. Google’s Transparency Report of RTBF Requests 
Google provides a Transparency Report detailing the number of 
requests it has received and their disposition.127 The Transparency 
Report is updated in near real time as Google decides more requests.128 
With a pie chart, Google indicates the percentage of webpages that it 
has delisted from its search versus the percentage of webpages that it 
has not delisted. A visitor to Google’s website can obtain the data by 
country from a dropdown menu listing each country.129 As of 
 
 122 Id.  
 123 Id. at 4. 
 124 See Art. 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Guidelines on the Implementation of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union Judgment on “Google Spain and Inc v. Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González” C-131-12, at 3, 9, 14/EN WP 225 
(Nov. 26, 2014) [hereinafter Art. 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Guidelines], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2014/wp225_en.pdf. The issue is at the center of a RTBF dispute in 
France, where Google is refusing to follow the French data protection authority’s order to 
extend the removal of links to Google.com. See Alex Hern, Google Says Non to French 
Demand to Expand Right to Be Forgotten Worldwide, GUARDIAN (July 30, 2015, 12:00 EDT), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/30/google-rejects-france-expand-right-
to-be-forgotten-worldwide. 
 125 See David Drummond, We Need to Talk About the Right to Be Forgotten, 
GUARDIAN (July 10, 2014, 5:05 PM EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2014/jul/10/right-to-be-forgotten-european-ruling-google-debate (“Of 
course, only two months in our process is still very much a work in progress. It’s why 
we incorrectly removed links to some articles last week (they’ve since been 
reinstated).”). 
 126 See Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 5. 
 127 Google Transparency Report: European Privacy Requests for Search Removals, 
supra note 20. 
 128 See id. 
 129 Id. 
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December 10, 2015, Google received approximately 356,012 requests 
related to 1,261,476 links.130 Google has found in favor of removal in 
approximately 42.1% of the requested webpages, a rate of acceptance 
consistent with its rate as of October in 2014.131 Google has rejected 
removal of 57.9% of the requested webpage links as of December 
2015.132 
The Transparency Report also provides twenty-three examples of 
RTBF claims that Google has decided.133 For example, Google granted 
the RTBF claims of several victims of crimes or their family members: 
(1) “[a] woman [from Italy who] requested that we remove a decades-
old article about her husband’s murder, which included her name” 
and (2) “[a] victim of rape [from Germany] asked us to remove a link 
to a newspaper article about the crime.”134 By contrast, Google rejected 
the requests of several people requesting removal of links of articles 
related to their professional or personal misconduct or criminal 
activity: (1) a person from Italy made “multiple requests . . . to remove 
20 links to recent articles about his arrest for financial crimes 
committed in a professional capacity,”135 (2) a media professional from 
the United Kingdom “requested that we remove 4 links to articles 
reporting on embarrassing content he posted to the Internet,”136 and 
(3) a person from the United Kingdom asked “to remove links to 
articles on the internet that reference his dismissal for sexual crimes 
committed on the job.”137 Sometimes, however, Google has removed 
links related to crimes for which the person has been rehabilitated 
under the national law.138 
 
 130 Id. (report on Dec. 10, 2015); see also Jeff John Roberts, Google Shows Sites That 
Get Most ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Requests, More Than 500K Pages Removed, FORTUNE 
(Nov. 24, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/11/24/google-forgotten-data/ (describing 
report on Nov. 24, 2015).  
 131 Google Transparency Report: European Privacy Requests for Search Removals, supra 
note 20, (report on Dec. 10, 2015); Ashley Zeckman, Right to Be Forgotten: Google 
Refreshes Stats, SEARCH ENGINE WATCH (Oct. 13, 2014), http://searchenginewatch. 
com/sew/news/2375322/right-to-be-forgotten-google-refreshes-stats#. 
 132 See Google Transparency Report: European Privacy Requests for Search Removals, 
supra note 20. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. (“A man asked that we remove a link to a news summary of a local 
magistrate’s decisions that included the man’s guilty verdict. Under the U.K. 
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, this conviction has been spent. We have removed the 
page from search results for his name.”). 
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Given Google’s role as the decision maker, it is “building a rich 
program of jurisprudence on the [RTBF] decision.”139 
4. Google Establishes Advisory Council on the RTBF 
Google established an external Advisory Council on the Right to Be 
Forgotten to seek further advice and guidance on how to decide RTBF 
requests and to balance an individual’s privacy right with the public’s 
right to information.140 The Council consisted of eight outside experts 
from European countries, plus former CEO Eric Schmidt and Chief 
Legal Officer David Drummond.141 The Council held public meetings 
to discuss the RTBF in seven cities in Europe; the public meetings 
were also recorded and posted for further viewing on YouTube.142 
On February 6, 2015, the Advisory Council issued a forty-one page 
Report.143 The Report advised Google to consider four criteria in 
deciding RTBF requests: (1) the data subject’s role in public life, (2) 
the nature of the information including suggestions on types of 
information militating toward privacy or toward public interest, (3) 
the source, and (4) the passage of time.144 The Report also advised 
Google on procedural and remedial aspects of how RTBF requests are 
processed and enforced. The Report recommended that Google retain 
its controversial policy of notifying webmasters if their webpages have 
been delisted and of limiting the geographical scope of delisting to 
national versions of Google (without extension to Google.com).145 
 
 139 See Natasha Lomas, Call for Google to Show Its Right to Be Forgotten Workings, 
TECHCRUNCH (May 14, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
http://techcrunch.com/2015/05/14/call-for-google-to-show-its-right-to-be-forgotten-
workings/ (quoting Peter Fleischer, Google Global Privacy Counsel). 
 140 See Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 12. 
 141 See Google Advisory Council, supra note 16. The experts were: Luciano Floridi, 
Professor of Philosophy and Ethics of Information at the University of Oxford; Sylvie 
Kauffman, Editorial Director, Le Monde; Lidia Kolucka-Zuk, Executive Director of the 
Trust for Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe; Frank La Rue, UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression of the UNHRC; Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, former Federal 
Minister of Justice in Germany; José-Luis Piñar, Professor of Law at San Pablo-CEU 
University of Madrid and former Director of the Spanish Data Protection Agency 
(“AEPD”); Peggy Valcke, Research Professor at University of Leuven; Jimmy Wales, 
Founder and Chair Emeritus, Board of Trustees, Wikimedia Foundation. See id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 See LUCIANO FLORIDI ET AL., THE ADVISORY COUNCIL TO GOOGLE ON THE RIGHT TO 
BE FORGOTTEN (2015), available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/ 
0B1UgZshetMd4cEI3SjlvV0hNbDA/view?pli=1. 
 144 Id. at 7-14. 
 145 Id. at 17-20. 
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5. Reporting to and Oversight by the Article 29 Working Party 
Google has reported to the Article 29 Working Party, which has 
monitored Google’s implementation of the RTBF.146 In July 2014, the 
Working Party met with Google, Bing, and Yahoo! to learn about the 
practices of the search engines in implementing the right.147 As 
mentioned above, the Working Party has disagreed with several 
aspects of Google’s implementation of the RTBF, particularly 
regarding the way in which it limits a delisting of a link only to the 
European version of Google.148 
B. Other Institutions Developing the Right to Be Forgotten, Post-Costeja 
Google is not alone in developing the RTBF. Several government 
actors or bodies are also involved in the process. Google is operating 
within a crowded field of actors. This section summarizes the key 
players. 
1. Article 29 Working Party and National DPAs 
The Article 29 Working Party has been the most visible institution 
in providing oversight to how search engines are implementing the 
RTBF.149 In July 2014, the Working Party asked Google and the other 
search engines to answer questions related to their implementation of 
the RTBF, both at a meeting and in writing.150 On November 26, 2014, 
the Working Party issued guidelines on its view of how the RTBF 
should be decided.151 The Guidelines contain thirteen criteria for 
search engines to consider in processing RTBF requests.152 
The national DPAs also retain the authority to regulate Google and 
to review the rejections of RTBF requests by search engines if the 
 
 146 See Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 1. 
 147 Press Release, Art. 29 Data Prot. Working Party, European DPAs Meet with 
Search Engines on the “Right to Be Forgotten,” July 25, 2014, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/press-material/press-release/ 
art29_press_material/2014/20140725_wp29_press_release_right_to_be_forgotten.pdf. 
 148 See Art. 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Guidelines, supra note 124, at 8-9. 
 149 See, e.g., Amy Gesenhues, EU Says Process for Reviewing Right to Be Forgotten 
Appeals Is Working, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (June 18, 2015, 3:37 PM), http:// 
searchengineland.com/eu-says-process-for-reviewing-right-to-be-forgotten-appeals-is-
working-223548. 
 150 See Responding to Article 29 Working Party’s Questions, supra note 21; see also 
note 147 and accompanying text. 
 151 See Art. 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Guidelines, supra note 124, at 1. 
 152 Id. at 13-20. 
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claimants appeal. A few DPAs have published results from appeals of 
Google’s decisions; the number of appeals is very low.153 France’s DPA 
ordered Google to apply its removal of links for successful claimants 
to Google’s search engine worldwide, but Google has yet to comply.154 
2. National Courts and CJEU 
Individuals can pursue RTBF claims in national courts after first 
seeking relief with the search engine and then, if necessary, seek an 
appeal with the national DPA, as in Costeja.155 The national courts 
decide the dispute and may also refer a legal issue regarding the EU 
right to be forgotten to the Court of Justice. Thus far, it is too early to 
tell what percentage of the thousands of rejections by Google will be 
appealed to national DPAs or the courts. The low rate of appeals of 
Google’s rejections to national DPAs thus far suggests that the rate of 
lawsuits in court will be even lower.156 
In one such appeal, the Court of Amsterdam upheld Google’s decision 
not to remove links to articles about the 2012 conviction of a man who 
ran an escort service and was convicted for “attempted incitement of 
contract killing.”157 The Court of Amsterdam ruled that the information 
related to the defendant’s conviction of a serious crime will necessarily 
 
 153 See, e.g., Sophie Curtis, EU ‘Right to Be Forgotten’: One Year On, TELEGRAPH (May 
13, 2015, 6:00 AM BST), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/11599909/ 
EU-right-to-be-forgotten-one-year-on.html (U.K.’s Information Commissioner’s Office 
(“ICO”) received 183 appeals of Google’s rejections; ICO agreed with 74% of Google’s 
decisions and disagreed with 26% (48)); Adrian Weckler, Bankers and Convicts Among 
2,300 Irish ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Requests, INDEPENDENT (April 30, 2015), 
http://www.independent.ie/business/technology/bankers-and-convicts-among-2300-
irish-right-to-be-forgotten-requests-31182796.html (Ireland’s Data Protection 
Commissioner (“DPC”) received only thirty appeals of Google’s decisions related to 
2,300 requests to remove 7,150 links to articles (of which Google rejected 
approximately 71%); DPC agreed with some of Google’s decisions, but disagreed with 
other decisions and rectified them with Google). 
 154 See Google Clashes with French Data Regulator, BBC NEWS (Sept. 21, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-34312698; Sam Schechner, French Privacy 
Watchdog Orders Google to Expand ‘Right to Be Forgotten,’ WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2015, 
8:08 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/french-privacy-watchdog-orders-google-to-
expand-right-to-be-forgotten-1434098033. 
 155 Case C-131/12, Costeja, 2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, ¶¶ 77–79 (May 13, 2014). 
 156 Some national data protection authorities have reported resolving some of the 
appeals they received. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.  
 157 See Joran Spauwen & Jens van den Brink, Dutch Google Spain Ruling: More 
Freedom of Speech, Less Right to Be Forgotten for Criminals, INFORRM’S BLOG (Sept. 27, 
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remain “relevant” and “will only be ‘excessive’ or ‘unnecessarily 
defamatory’ [to justify a RTBF claim] in very exceptional cases, for 
instance when the offense committed is brought up again without a 
clear reason, apparently for no other purpose than to damage the 
individual involved, if reporting is not factual but rather a ‘slanging-
match.’”158 The Court of Amsterdam interpreted the Costeja decision in 
a narrow manner, ruling that “[t]he . . . judgment does not intend to 
protect individuals against all negative communications on the Internet, 
but only against ‘being pursued’ for a long time by ‘irrelevant’, ‘excessive’ 
or ‘unnecessarily defamatory’ expressions.”159 Other national courts 
could take more expansive approaches. The CJEU will likely be asked to 
clarify the scope of the RTBF in future cases. 
3. EU Commission, EU Council, and EU Parliament 
The EU’s executive and legislative bodies are also important players 
in the development of the RTBF. Back in January 2012, even before 
the Costeja decision, the EU Commission proposed the adoption of the 
EU General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), which would 
replace the current Directive and establish a uniform EU law that 
applies directly in all EU members.160 The EU Parliament and Council 
agreed on the text of the GDPR in December 2015, and a formal vote 
is expected early in 2016.161 
One of the key provisions is the right to be forgotten.162 The GDPR 
characterizes the right as the “right to be forgotten and to erasure.”163 
The proposed Article 17 lists several grounds justifying a claim of 
erasure, including: 
(a) “the data are no longer necessary in relation to the 
purposes for which they were collected or otherwise 
processed;” 
 
 158 Id. (citation omitted). 
 159 Id. 
 160 See Jan Philipp Albrecht, EU General Data Protection Regulation: State of Play 
and 10 Main Issues, GREENS/EFA 1 (Jan. 7, 2015), available at http:// 
www.janalbrecht.eu/fileadmin/material/Dokumente/Data_protection_state_of_play_10
_points_010715.pdf. 
 161 See Richard Dickinson et al., General Data Protection Regulation — Terms 
Agreed, “One Continent, One Law,” LEXOLOGY (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www. 
lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=66397735-d41e-47e0-8282-25b9197a469f. 
 162 Id. at 2. 
 163 See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 14, § 3.4.3.3, at 9. 
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(b) “the data subject withdraws consent on which the 
processing is based according to point (a) of Article 6(1), or 
when the storage period consented to has expired, and where 
there is no other legal ground for the processing of the data;” 
(c) “the data subject objects to the processing of personal 
data pursuant to Article 19;” 
(d) “the processing of the data does not comply with this 
Regulation for other reasons.”164 
Article 17(3) recognizes that erasure is not justified, however, if “the 
retention of the personal data is necessary” for the following reasons: 
(a) freedom of expression under Article 80; 
(b) the public interest “in the area of public health in 
accordance with Article 81;” 
(c) “historical, statistical and scientific research purposes in 
accordance with Article 83;” 
(d) “compliance with a legal obligation to retain the 
personal data by Union or Member State law to which the 
controller is subject; Member State laws shall meet an 
objective of public interest, respect the essence of the right to 
the protection of personal data and be proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued;” and 
(e) “in the cases referred to in paragraph 4,” which lists four 
other situations.165 
Even if the Council passes the Regulation, a period of transition will 
likely be needed before the Regulation goes into effect.166 The 
continuing debate over the GDPR underscores how much the right to 
be forgotten is still under development. 
 
 164 Id. art. 17(1), at 51-52. The EU Parliament’s version of the Regulation has slight 
variations from the Commission’s proposal, including an additional reason for 
denying a request: “a court or regulatory authority based in the Union has ruled as 
final and absolute that the data concerned must be erased.” See Memorandum, 
European Comm’n, Progress on EU Data Protection Reform Now Irreversible 
Following European Parliament Vote (Mar. 12, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-14-186_en.htm. 
 165 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 14, art. 17(3), at 52. 
 166 Id. art. 91, at 99 (proposed Article 91 allows a two-year transitional period). 
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III. THE THEORY OF THE PRIVATE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY 
This Part sets forth a theory to explain the concept of the private 
administrative agency and why such agencies have grown especially in 
the Internet context. Private administrative agencies are private 
entities — for-profit corporations, nonprofit entities, and other non-
governmental organizations — that perform public functions meant to 
serve the public at large by a formal or informal delegation of power 
from the government.167 Google’s role in developing the right to be 
forgotten is perhaps the apex of power for a private administrative 
agency. Google has assumed a primary role in shaping a fundamental 
individual right that applies in 32 countries.168 
A. The Public Administrative Agency 
The twentieth century witnessed the rise of the modern 
administrative state.169 The following section briefly describes some of 
the main attributes and functions of administrative agencies — i.e., 
what makes an administrative agency an agency. Applying a 
comparative law approach, the section includes discussion of both 
U.S. and EU administrative law to elaborate general principles that are 
relevant for understanding my concept of the private administrative 
agency.170 
 
 167 See infra Part III.B.1. 
 168 In addition to the 28 members of the EU, Google also has extended the right to 4 
other countries in the European Free Trade Association (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway 
and Switzerland). See Loek Essers, Europe Wants Google to Expand ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ 
Censorship to Global Search, PC WORLD (Nov. 26, 2014, 9:16 AM), http://www. 
pcworld.com/article/2852792/eu-wants-google-to-apply-right-to-be-forgotten-delistings-
to-global-com-domain.html. 
 169 In the United States, the explosion of agencies corresponded with the New Deal 
program. See RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 3-4 
(6th ed. 2011). Some scholars place the origins of the administrative state in the 
United States back to the nineteenth century. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Foreword, The 
American Model of Federal Administrative Law: Remembering the First One Hundred 
Years, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 975, 982 (2010). 
 170 The choice of U.S. and EU law is based on the expectation that Google’s lawyers 
and policymakers who are implementing the right to be forgotten are likely to have 
been influenced by U.S. and EU concepts of law. The discussion also draws from 
comparative law methods to distill elements that may be worth considering in this 
transnational context.  
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1. Delegation of Authority 
A key component of the administrative agency is the delegation of 
government power from the executive or legislature to the agency to 
perform a regulatory function. Indeed, the term “agency” itself implies 
a delegation from one actor to another. A basic question of 
administrative law is how much power and discretion can the 
government delegate to an agency. U.S. scholarship has dwelt on this 
issue and the related non-delegation doctrine, which, as an application 
of separation of powers inherent in the Constitution, the Supreme 
Court has sparingly used to invalidate some delegations of power.171 In 
the past, the EU recognized a non-delegation doctrine that imposed 
stricter limits on what powers can be delegated to an EU agency.172 
But the Court of Justice’s decision in ESMA-shortselling adopted a 
more permissive approach to delegating powers to EU agencies, which 
have grown in number to over 40 agencies.173 Theorists often lament 
expansive delegations of power to agencies “without an explicit, 
constitution-based authorization by the people.”174 Nonetheless, 
“agencification” — the creation of and delegation of powers to 
agencies — continues to increase, especially now in the EU.175 
Delegations of power to agencies can be express or implied. For 
example, the legislature can pass a law that expressly gives an agency 
the power to interpret a statute and to issue rules regarding its 
interpretation.176 Alternatively, the legislature might enact a law that 
establishes an agency, but without specifying such an interpretative 
power.177 The agency, however, might understand its statutory 
 
 171 See Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist 
Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1177-85 (1999). 
 172 See Damien Geradin, The Development of European Regulatory Agencies: What the 
EU Should Learn from American Experience, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1, 9-10 (2004). 
 173 See Case C-270/12, United Kingdom of Great Britain v. European Parliament 
(ESMA-shortselling), 2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0270, ¶¶ 53–55 (Jan. 22, 2014); 
Miroslava Scholten & Marloes van Rijsbergen, The Limits of Agencification in the 
European Union, 15 GERMAN L.J. 1223, 1249-51 (2014); see also Agencies and Other EU 
Bodies, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/about-eu/agencies/index_en.htm (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2015). 
 174 See, e.g., Scholten & van Rijsbergen, supra note 173, at 1224. 
 175 See id. at 1223-25. 
 176 See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
843-44 (1984) (“If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an 
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the 
statute by regulation.”). 
 177 See, e.g., id. at 844 (“Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a 
particular question is implicit rather than explicit.”). 
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directive to include an implied power to engage in such 
interpretation.178 
2. Administration of Public Functions 
With their delegation of power, administrative agencies perform a 
variety of administrative duties in a myriad of contexts. Some of the 
more common functions include (i) lawmaking through interpretation 
and rulemaking, (ii) investigation, information gathering, and 
enforcement, (iii) developing expertise for the administration of 
public functions, and (iv) adjudication. Each function is discussed in 
turn. Fleshing out these functions here will be useful in later analyzing 
Google’s role in the RTBF. 
a. Lawmaking: Rules, Interpretations, and Guidance 
One important function of administrative agencies in the United 
States is the exercise of lawmaking power.179 The lawmaking power 
may arise from the legislature’s grant of authority to the agency to 
interpret and fill in gaps in a statute that regulates the field that the 
agency oversees.180 Sometimes the delegation of lawmaking power is 
expressly recognized in the statute (making the agency’s 
interpretations entitled to Chevron deference from the courts181), while 
other times it is only implied.182 In the United States, the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) requires legislative rules (i.e., 
administrative rules that are binding law) to be instituted through a 
procedure of public notice and a period for public comment.183 
Agencies often engage in other interpretative tasks that fall short of the 
issuance of legislative rules, yet these agency interpretations can 
nonetheless provide important guidance about the meaning of the law 
 
 178 Under U.S. law, agency interpretations emanating from an implied power are 
less likely to be entitled to so-called Chevron deference, whereas interpretations from 
an express power are usually entitled to such deference. United States v. Mead Corp., 
533 U.S. 218, 229-30 (2001); see also Michael P. Healy, Spurious Interpretation Redux: 
Mead and the Shrinking Domain of Statutory Ambiguity, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 678-79 
(2002) (explaining difference of express and implied delegation under Mead).  
 179 See Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of 
Administrative Lawmaking, 46 GA. L. REV. 117, 142 (2011). 
 180 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 181 See id. at 843-44. 
 182 Id. at 843. 
 183 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 893, 893 (2004). 
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in the agency’s views. For example, an agency can issue “circulars, 
advice letters, guidance documents, staff manuals, and the like.”184 
By contrast, although the EU administrative state is still evolving, 
EU agencies typically lack formal power to engage in lawmaking.185 
EU agencies do not engage in formal policymaking, but instead serve 
advisory functions and can issue guidance and other “soft law” 
recommendations to the EU Commission.186 Some of the agencies 
exercise “strong recommendatory power,” making recommendations 
that “carry considerable weight” with the Commission.187 Paul Craig 
describes these “quasi-regulatory agencies” as increasingly more 
common in the EU.188 The European Food Safety Authority and the 
European Medicines Agency “provide technical and scientific 
assistance that is the basis for a decision made by the Commission,” 
for example.189 
b. Investigation, Information Gathering, and Enforcement 
Agencies also perform investigations and information gathering. For 
example, in the United States, after an employee files a charge of 
discrimination, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) conducts an investigation to determine if there is 
reasonable cause to support the claim.190 The Securities Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) investigates insider trading of stocks.191 In other 
contexts, the Federal Bureau Investigation (“FBI”) investigates 
whether federal crimes have been committed, and the Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”) investigates tax fraud.192 Relatedly, agencies 
often are charged with enforcement responsibilities, that is, to make 
 
 184 Manning, supra note 183, at 893. 
 185 See Scholten & van Rijsbergen, supra note 173, at 1231-32; Peter Strauss et al., 
EU Rulemaking, AM. BAR, 84-85 (Jan. 2008), available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/migrated/adminlaw/eu/RulemakingFinal31008.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 186 See PAUL CRAIG, EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 149-50 (2d ed. 2012); Scholten & van 
Rijsbergen, supra note 173, at 1231-33; Strauss et al., supra note 185, at 85-86.  
 187 See CRAIG, supra note 186, at 150-51. 
 188 See id. at 150-51. 
 189 Id. at 149. 
 190 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012). 
 191 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2015); see also Spencer Derek Klein, Note, Insider 
Trading, SEC Decision-Making, and the Calculus of Investor Confidence, 16 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 665, 672-73 (1988). 
 192 See, e.g., Anthony R. Gordon, A Day in the Life of an FBI Agent, 5 NEV. LAW. 28, 
28 (1997); Edward D. Urquhart & Susan Schwyn Martinez, In Memoriam, Handling 
Investigations Involving Civil and Criminal Tax Cases, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 193, 209 
(2003).  
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sure entities and individuals comply with the law and regulations.193 
EU agencies typically have fewer formal powers in terms of 
investigation and enforcement, but they do commonly provide 
information and studies to the EU Commission.194 
c. Developing Expertise for the Administration of Important Public 
Functions 
More generally, agencies are established to develop expertise in a 
certain area that requires the administration of tasks related to 
important public functions.195 The basic idea is to establish an 
institution with the proper expertise to tackle complex problems in a 
certain field, on an ongoing basis.196 Agencies develop expertise, in 
other words. One U.S. scholar described the development of expertise 
(i.e. “the competence theme”) as, “several interrelated concepts 
developed in response to institutional failings during the Great 
Depression: institutional expertise, administrative agencies’ political 
and epistemic independence, and experts’ capacity to use law to 
optimize citizens’ well-being.”197 Or, as the EU Commission stated, 
agencies “would make the executive more effective at [the] European 
level in highly specialized technical areas requiring advanced expertise 
and continuity, credibility and visibility of public action.”198 Agencies 
are often assigned to certain fields of regulation that are important for 
society: food and drug safety, environmental protection, workplace 
safety, national security, intellectual property, telecommunications, 
trade, banking, and financial institutions.199 
 
 193 See, e.g., Elaine Buckberg & Frederick C. Dunbar, Disgorgement: Punitive 
Demands and Remedial Offers, 63 BUS. LAW. 347, 351-52 (2008) (discussing SEC 
enforcement); Urquhart & Martinez, supra note 192, at 231-32 (discussing IRS 
enforcement). 
 194 See CRAIG, supra note 186, at 152. 
 195 See generally Todd S. Aagaard, Factual Premises of Statutory Interpretation in 
Agency Review Cases, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 366, 391 (2009) (discussing how agencies 
can deploy their expertise to better parse facts in specialized cases). 
 196 See id. 
 197 Jeffrey Rudd, The Evolution of the Legal Process School’s “Institutional 
Competence” Theme: Unintended Consequences for Environmental Law, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
1045, 1054 (2006). 
 198 See CRAIG, supra note 186, at 143 & n.8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 199 See id. at 144-45. 
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d. Adjudication and Rendering of Decisions 
Another important role of agencies is adjudication — the rendering 
of individualized decisions on a disputed matter that binds the parties 
involved. In the United States, adjudication by agencies is quite 
common; in fact, “[a]dministrative agencies adjudicate massive 
numbers of individual disputes, far exceeding the number resolved by 
courts.”200 In such adjudication, an agency has broad discretion to 
develop what is essentially agency case law.201 Whereas an agency’s 
rulemaking can be likened to legislation, an agency’s adjudication can 
be likened to court decisions.202 Although fewer EU agencies have 
powers to adjudicate claims or disputes, several of them do — for 
example, the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market 
(“OHIM”), the Community Plant Variety Office (“CPVO”), and the 
European Aviation Safety Agency (“EASA”).203 
B. The Private Administrative Agency 
1. Definition 
Under the traditional conception of the administrative agency, an 
agency arises from delegation of some power from the legislature or 
sometimes the executive to handle administration of some tasks.204 
The agency is public in at least two important senses: (i) it derives its 
authority or responsibility for administration of certain tasks from the 
elected branches of government and (ii) it performs public functions 
that are meant to serve the public or society at large.205 However, 
private entities — including for-profit corporations, non-profit 
organizations, and other nongovernmental organizations — could 
conceivably perform the same public roles. Much of the privatization 
 
 200 See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 56 ALA. L. 
REV. 693, 693 (2005). 
 201 Id. at 698. 
 202 See Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act 
Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 106 (2003). 
 203 See CRAIG, supra note 186, at 149-50. 
 204 See CASS ET AL., supra note 169, at 3. 
 205 See id. at 6 (describing public interest view of agencies); see also Shiv Narayan 
Persaud, Parallel Investigations Between Administrative and Law Enforcement Agencies: A 
Question of Civil Liberties, 39 U. DAYTON L. REV. 77, 81 (2013) (“For, once the 
legislature clearly defines agency standards, the delegated authority is intended to 
operate for and serve the public good.”). 
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debate revolves around the legitimacy and desirability of 
“outsourcing” such public functions to private entities.206 
For the purposes of this Article, a private administrative agency is 
defined as a non-governmental entity that (i) derives its authority or 
responsibility for administration of certain tasks through a formal or 
informal delegation of power by the government and (ii) performs 
public functions that are meant to serve the public or society at 
large.207 If a private entity satisfies both elements, then it can be 
classified as a private administrative agency. Before analyzing Google 
(in Part IV), the following discussion sets forth a theoretical basis for 
envisioning such entities as private administrative agencies.208 
2. Weber and Bureaucratic Organizations 
My conception of the private administrative agency draws upon the 
theory of Max Weber, the sociological theorist perhaps best known for 
his theory of bureaucracy.209 What is common to both public and 
 
 206 See, e.g., Kimberly N. Brown, Government by Contract and the Structural 
Constitution, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 491, 531-32 (2011) (“[T]he mere fact that one 
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 207 Delegations of power to private administrative agencies can be categorized 
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characterized as temporary, or private, administrative agencies. See Martha Minow, 
Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary Administrative 
Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010, 2019-26 (1997) (discussing judicially created 
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Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1148, 1165 
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 209 See S. Michael Hare, Toward a Multidimensional Model of Social Interaction as 
Related to Conflict Resolution Theory, 8 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 803, 816 (2002). 
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private administrative agencies is their bureaucratic organization.210 A 
bureaucracy is a rational form of modern authority that is “grounded 
in laws and wielded by administrative structure capable of enforcing 
clear and consistent rules.”211 As Weber postulated, the bureaucracy 
becomes a form of domination that is based on the “belief in the 
validity of legal statute and functional ‘competence’ based on rationally 
created rules.”212 Bureaucratic organizations form a way to structure 
responsibilities in the most efficient manner in a capitalist state.213 
A key insight of Weber’s theory of bureaucracy is that it applies to 
government and private institutions alike: 
The principle of hierarchical office authority is found in all 
bureaucratic structures: in state and ecclesiastical structures as 
well as in large party organizations and private enterprises. It 
does not matter for the character of bureaucracy whether its 
authority is called “private” or “public.”214 
. . . . 
Office management, at least all specialized office management 
— and such management is distinctly modern — usually 
presupposes thorough training in a field of specialization. This, 
too, holds increasingly for the modern executive and employee of a 
private enterprise, just as it does for the state officials.215 
Bureaucratic organization “is formally capable of application to all 
kinds of administrative tasks,” whether public or private.216 “The first 
such basis of bureaucratization has been the quantitative extension of 
 
 210 See MOISÉS NAÍM, THE END OF POWER 40-41 (2013). 
 211 Id. at 40. 
 212 See MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 
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 214 Id. at 957. 
 215 Id. at 958 (emphasis added). 
 216 See id. at 223. 
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administrative tasks,”217 which often relate to “social welfare 
policies.”218 
Thus, under Weber’s theory, viewing a corporation like Google as 
the same type of bureaucratic organization as a government agency 
would be natural.219 “Normally, the very large, modern capitalist 
enterprises are themselves unequalled models of strict bureaucratic 
organization.”220 Thus, the choice is not between public and private 
organizations.221 Instead, “[t]he choice is only that between 
bureaucracy and dilettantism in the field of administration.”222 The 
bureaucratic form of governance mirrors the rational ordering that 
developed for industrialization and capitalism.223 
The Internet itself may be a facilitator of bureaucracies. Although 
writing in the beginning of the twentieth century, Weber also 
recognized the role that modern communication (e.g., the telegraph) 
served as “pacemakers of bureaucratization.”224 He believed modern 
communication required at least some public administration, just as 
public roads and waterways did.225 In a line that is no less true today, 
Weber argued that “[a] certain degree of development of the means of 
communication in turn is one of the most important prerequisites for 
the possibility of bureaucratic administration, though it alone is not 
decisive.”226 Thus, it should not be surprising how adept Google is at 
administration. Google developed the most popular search engine for 
the Internet, enabling millions of people to find information online.227 
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Google can be viewed as a pacemaker of bureaucratization. The role 
that Google serves in its core business of search is inherently a public 
role as an administrator of a vital service related to the most important 
means of mass communication today, the Internet. 
Of course, Weber was also skeptical of the social effects of 
bureaucratization and the modern economic order, which might 
become the so-called “iron cage” that traps individuals in a highly 
structured order that is too hard to escape.228 For our purposes, it is 
sufficient to table these concerns and instead focus on Weber’s general 
theory of bureaucratic organizations. Weber’s theory provides a 
theoretical foundation through which to view certain private entities 
as administrative agencies. 
3. Coase, Transaction Costs, and Outsourcing 
Once we understand the term “administrative agency” as applying 
equally to public and private entities based on their bureaucratic 
organization to handle certain public tasks, we need a theory to 
explain why governments might delegate some public tasks to private 
instead of public agencies. 
The theory of Nobel Prize-winning economist Ronald Coase 
provides one answer. Coase developed a theory to explain why firms 
integrate some tasks internally, while leaving other tasks to dealings 
with other entities (such as suppliers).229 According to Coase, vertical 
integration within the firm occurs as a way to deal with transaction 
costs.230 A firm can reduce transaction costs by bringing some 
responsibilities in-house, while outsourcing others.231 Coase’s theory 
of vertical integration has application beyond businesses. As Moisés 
Naím explains: 
 
share-of-search-engines/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2015) (aggregating data continuously). 
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 231 See NAÍM, supra note 210, at 44 (“The propensity to operate through a vertically 
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The idea that transaction costs determine the size and even the 
nature of an organization can be applied to many other fields 
beyond industry to explain why not just modern corporations 
but also government agencies, armies, and churches became 
large and centralized. In all such cases, it has been rational and 
efficient to do so.232 
Thus, governments are faced with the same basic question of 
integration as businesses confront — whether to bring responsibilities 
in-house or to outsource them. The privatization debate — whether 
for social services,233 police,234 prisons,235 security forces,236 or other 
functions — raises this basic question.237 One way to answer this 
question is for the government to compare the transactions costs of 
keeping the responsibilities in-house versus the costs of outsourcing 
them.238 Of course, where important public interests and values are at 
stake, governments should consider more than simply transaction 
costs.239 But economic analysis can provide at least an explanation, if 
not justification, for why governments might outsource some tasks to 
private actors.240 It may be more efficient to do so. 
4. Mixed Administration, Co-Regulation, and Global 
Administrative Law 
The final component to my theory of the private administrative 
agency comes from administrative law scholarship. My theory of the 
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private administrative agency fits within and builds on the concepts of 
mixed administration in the United States, co-regulation in Europe, 
and global administrative law. 
In 2000, Professor Jody Freeman conceptualized private actors as 
participants in the administration of agency responsibilities under a 
form of “mixed administration.” According to Freeman, 
“[c]ontemporary regulation might be best described as a regime of 
‘mixed administration’ in which private actors and government share 
regulatory roles.”241 Her approach canvassed different examples.242 By 
examining various examples of mixed administration (such as in 
social services, standard setting, and prisons), Freeman shows that 
“[p]rivate individuals, private firms, financial institutions, public 
interest organizations, domestic and international standard-setting 
bodies, professional associations, labor unions, business networks, 
advisory boards, expert panels, self-regulating organizations, and non-
profit groups all help to perform many of the regulatory functions 
that, at least in legal theory, we assume agencies perform alone.”243 
Freeman acknowledges the potential dangers to democratic 
accountability that private actors pose in mixed administration, but 
she also argues that “alternative accountability mechanisms” (e.g., 
market forces, norms, internal procedures) may chasten private actors 
in their exercise of discretion.244 Moreover, private actors may provide 
distinct benefits by contributing “to the efficacy and legitimacy of 
administration.”245 Freeman calls for the adoption of “aggregate 
accountability” measures — including “informal, nontraditional, and 
nongovernmental mechanisms for ensuring accountability.”246 
Beginning in the late 1980s, Australian and then European scholars 
developed a theory of “co-regulation,” in which “a body with statutory 
regulatory authority delegates to the relevant industry responsibility 
for maintaining and applying a code of practice that the statutory 
regulator has approved, continuing to oversee the co-regulation, with 
retained powers to intervene where necessary.”247 Co-regulation is 
viewed as a form of governance (instead of government) that 
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combines public and private actors.248 It contrasts with self-regulation 
in which private actors are not constrained by government oversight. 
The EU has formally recognized co-regulation as a legitimate type of 
governance in the Inter-Institutional Agreement on Better Law-
Making.249 Proponents of co-regulation contend that it offers 
advantages in affording flexibility to private actors to implement a 
public goal or service recognized by law.250 The UK Better Regulation 
Executive even argued that “[c]o-regulatory initiatives are more likely 
to be successful as those being regulated have scope to use their 
experience to design and implement their own solutions.”251 
What distinguishes my concept of private administrative agency 
from the theories of mixed administration and co-regulation is my 
focus on the private entity involved. Both mixed administration and 
co-regulation describe the broader relationship between government 
and private entity,252 whereas my concept of the private administrative 
agency hones in on the private entity itself. Mixed administration and 
co-regulation are helpful in pointing out the existence of multiple 
actors, public and private, that are involved in certain forms of 
governance and regulation. My theory focuses on the nature, function, 
or structure of the private entity, particularly in how it fulfills its role 
as a regulator: some private entities operate as administrative agencies, 
displaying some of the same attributes and performing the same 
functions as government agencies. Although private administrative 
agencies are not the same species as public agencies, they are within 
the same genus. 
The final additional theoretical component relates to the global scale 
of Google. Professors Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, Richard 
Stewart, and others have developed a growing body of scholarship on 
what they characterize as global administrative law, which is defined 
“as comprising the mechanisms, principles, practices, and supporting 
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social understandings that promote or otherwise affect the 
accountability of global administrative bodies, in particular by 
ensuring they meet adequate standards of transparency, participation, 
reasoned decision, and legality, and by providing effective review of 
the rules and decisions they make.”253 
Global administrative law is similar to theories of mixed 
administration and co-regulation in that global administrative law also 
describes more fluid relationships among public and private actors in a 
field of regulation than the traditional state actor.254 The big 
difference, however, is that global administrative law focuses on fields 
of regulation that have been elevated to the transnational or 
international level.255 The problems associated with globalized 
interdependence “cannot be addressed effectively by isolated national 
regulatory and administrative measures.”256 Regulatory power is 
shifted from national governments to other entities that have a more 
global reach, including “[g]lobal administrative bodies” such as 
“formal intergovernmental regulatory bodies, informal 
intergovernmental regulatory networks and coordination 
arrangements, national regulatory bodies operating with reference to 
an international intergovernmental regime, hybrid public-private 
regulatory bodies, and some private regulatory bodies exercising 
transnational governance functions of particular public 
significance.”257 As we shall see in Part IV, add to this list: Google. 
C. Private Administrative Agencies in the Internet Context 
Private entities ranging from associations and nonprofits to for-
profit corporations administer a variety of functions that serve the 
public at large in the Internet context. These private entities can be 
viewed as private administrative agencies in the ways in which they 
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wield regulatory power, process disputes, and interpret and apply legal 
rules. This section explains why private administrative agencies may 
be common in the Internet context. 
1. Decentralized Nature of the Internet 
The Internet context may be especially conducive for private 
administrative agencies to develop. The history of the Internet shows 
how it developed into a decentralized international network that was 
not under the control of governments.258 The Internet developed with 
a laissez faire approach, which eschewed intrusive regulations by 
governments.259 In several case studies, Christopher Marsden has 
documented how co-regulation between public and private actors is a 
popular occurrence in the Internet context.260 
The Internet started out in the 1960s as a project of the U.S. 
Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(“DARPA”), which created a military network called the ARPANET.261 
DARPA eventually turned control over the ARPANET to the National 
Science Foundation (“NSF”).262 NSF developed the network into 
NSFNet, which was broadened for use outside the military by 
academics and researchers.263 NSF outsourced a good deal of the 
upgrade and expansion of the network and the Internet backbones to 
telecom companies, IBM, and the state of Michigan.264 In 1992, as the 
number of users and networks connected to the NSFNet grew, NSF 
decided to turn over management of the network’s technical 
administration to public and private entities.265 Finally, in 1995, NSF 
stopped funding the network and it became the Internet — a 
decentralized, privately operated network whose equipment and 
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governance were dispersed among various private actors, companies, 
and entities.266 
Once NSF unleashed the Internet from U.S. government oversight, 
private investment in the Internet exploded.267 So did the number of 
Internet users, which went from approximately 26 million in 1995 to 
400 million in 2000, an increase of more than 15 times over.268 During 
this time, President Clinton and Vice President Gore set forth a vision 
of the Internet that was guided by a laissez faire approach by 
governments.269 As Clinton said, “[b]ecause the Internet has such 
explosive potential for prosperity, it should be a global free-trade zone. 
It should be a place where Government makes every effort first, as the 
Vice President said, not to stand in the way, to do no harm . . . . We 
want to encourage the private sector to regulate itself as much as 
possible.”270 The Internet, when released from U.S. government 
control, evolved into a decentralized, private network of international 
scale. The U.S. government decided to favor a laissez faire or non-
regulatory approach to the Internet, viewing with skepticism intrusive 
government regulations.271 While other countries were not obliged to 
follow the same approach as the United States, it became a popular 
approach among many countries around the world.272 
2. Example: ICANN Nonprofit and the Domain Name System 
The most well-known example of a private administrative agency in 
the Internet context is the Internet Corporation of Assigned Names 
and Numbers (“ICANN”), which regulates the entire Domain Name 
System (“DNS”) for the Internet.273 The delegation of power to ICANN 
resulted from President Clinton’s 1997 directive to privatize the 
 
 266 See Michael W. Loudenslager, Allowing Another Policeman on the Information 
Superhighway: State Interests and Federalism on the Internet in the Face of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 191, 261 (2003). 
 267 See Brett Frischmann, Privatization and Commercialization of the Internet 
Infrastructure, 2 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 25 (2001). 
 268 See id. at 25 n.77. 
 269 See William J. Clinton, Remarks Announcing the Electronic Commerce 
Initiative (July 1, 1997), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-1997-07-
07/pdf/WCPD-1997-07-07-Pg1003.pdf. 
 270 Id.  
 271 See Lyombe Eko, Many Spiders, One Worldwide Web: Towards a Typology of 
Internet Regulation, 6 COMM. L. & POL’Y 445, 450-52 (2001); Clinton, supra note 269. 
 272 Eko, supra note 271, at 451 (“This self-regulation model soon became the de 
facto Internet regulation standard at the national and international levels.”). 
 273 See Daniela Michele Spencer, Note, Much Ado About Nothing: ICANN’s New 
GTLDs, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865, 868-69 (2014). 
  
2016] Recognizing Rights in Real Time 1065 
Internet.274 In 1998, the U.S. Department of Commerce entered into 
an agreement with the newly formed non-profit organization ICANN 
to delegate to ICANN the authority over the DNS and the operation of 
the root server system that enables domain names to identify unique 
addresses for websites on the Internet.275 However, the delegation of 
power to ICANN is subject to renewal, and the Department of 
Commerce retains ultimate control over the authoritative root file for 
the Internet.276 Whether the U.S. government should continue to 
retain this ultimate authority remains controversial.277 The Obama 
Administration considered ways to pass control over the root to a 
nongovernmental international group of representatives, but, in 
December 2014, Congress passed an amendment to the budget bill 
that prevents the Commerce Department from using any funding “to 
relinquish the responsibility . . . with respect to Internet domain name 
system functions, including responsibility with respect to the 
authoritative root zone file.”278 
Although critics have attacked the U.S. government’s delegation of 
power to ICANN on numerous grounds,279 what is striking about it for 
our purposes is that the delegation of power to ICANN was formalized 
by written contract.280 The U.S. government made a conscious 
decision to privatize the oversight for the domain name system and 
formally to delegate power to a nonprofit organization. 
Given this formal delegation of power, ICANN can be viewed as a 
private administrative agency. ICANN functions as an administrative 
agency in overseeing the DNS and developing policies related to it. For 
example, ICANN holds public meetings that “are free and open to 
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all.”281 It publishes proposals that are subject to public comment for at 
least 40 days.282 Some of its proposals, such as the policy to create new 
generic top level domains, ICANN’s Board votes on and approves.283 
ICANN has also promulgated the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute 
Resolution Policy (“UDRP”) that applies to all registered domain 
names.284 The UDRP is akin to a rulemaking by a public agency. It 
offers a form of alternative dispute resolution for trademark owners to 
deal with the problem of cyber-squatting or bad faith registrations of 
domain names containing trademarks.285 UDRP claims are decided by 
a panel of lawyers assigned by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization Arbitration and Mediation Center, which itself can be 
considered a private administrative agency that serves a quasi-
adjudicative role. 
ICANN is but one of numerous examples of a private administrative 
agency that serves important public functions in the Internet 
context.286 As Part IV explains, Google is as well. 
IV. GOOGLE AS A PRIVATE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY ADMINISTERING 
THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 
Applying the theories of Weber and Coase, this Part conceives of 
Google as a private administrative agency administering the right to be 
forgotten. As a private administrative agency, Google is exercising 
quasi-lawmaking, quasi-adjudicative, and quasi-enforcement powers 
in how it administers the right to be forgotten in the EU. Although 
this delegation of power raises serious concerns for democratic 
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accountability and due process, the following Part V will later defend 
the delegation of power subject to greater transparency and oversight. 
A. Structure of Google 
Under Weber’s theory of bureaucracies and Coase’s theory of the 
firm, viewing Google as an administrative agency no longer seems 
odd. Like an agency, Google is a vertically integrated organization — a 
bureaucracy.287 Google has a market capitalization of $365.46 billion 
and a staff of 46,170 employees in over 70 offices in over 40 countries 
around the world.288 At least in some areas, such as Washington, D.C., 
Google even draws some of its executives and employees from 
government agencies, such as the Department of Defense — further 
blurring the lines between public and private agency.289 
Likewise, the EU government bodies are bureaucracies that face 
questions similar to the ones faced by firms on whether to internalize 
certain operating costs within their own bureaucracy or to outsource 
them to other entities.290 Indeed, one useful way to think of the 
relationship between Google and the Data Protection Authorities and 
the EU government actors is in terms of transaction costs. The 
national data protection agencies could have processed RTBF claims in 
the first instance, but probably not without an increase in transaction 
costs in setting up or updating their online systems specifically for 
RTBF claims and in hiring more staff to process RTBF claims in each 
country. Each of the 28 national DPAs would have to incur some 
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duplicative start-up costs to set up or update an online system for 
RTBF claims. And, at least in countries with high volumes of claims, 
more staff would likely be needed. Within the first nine months of 
Google’s implementation of its online system, it processed the 
following number of RTBF requests for the top five countries in terms 
of requests: (1) 45,628 from France, (2) 37,836 from Germany, (3) 
28,572 from Great Britain, (4) 20,770 from Spain, and (5) 17,029 from 
Italy.291 Many of the other countries had far fewer requests (a few 
thousand or less), but even then the number of requests represents an 
increase in workload for the respective DPA.292 
The EU’s decision not to internalize the initial processing of RTBF 
claims within the national Data Protection Authorities in each of the 
28 EU members was arguably more efficient. Viewed under Coase’s 
theory, the DPAs and the EU incurred little transaction costs in 
allowing Google to become the initial decision-maker. From the EU’s 
perspective, it was far more efficient for Google to set up one central 
claims system for all 28 EU countries than for each one of them to set 
up its own system (or the EU to set up an entirely new EU-wide 
system that would have to coordinate with each national DPA).293 
Almost within two weeks, Google set up an online claims system in 
the EU for RTBF claims.294 Moreover, from a jurisprudential view, the 
arrangement has its own advantages. With 28 different national DPAs, 
the likelihood that different offices would have taken different views 
of the RTBF seems at least moderate, if not great. It would not have 
been surprising if some offices (such as the United Kingdom versus 
France) decided similar requests in a conflicting manner.295 Given the 
differences in size and staff of the various DPAs, one also would 
expect varying levels of quality in the review process among the 
DPAs.296 With Google, at least all of the requests are receiving 
 
 291 See Google Transparency Report: European Privacy Requests for Search Removals, 
supra note 20 (reflecting data taken Feb. 28, 2015). 
 292 See id. 
 293 See Edward Lee, Judge Google: Why the EU Should Embrace Google’s Role in the Right 
to Be Forgotten, HUFFINGTON POST (May 7, 2015, 4:59 PM EDT), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/edward-lee/judge-google-why-the-eu-s_b_7232688.html. 
 294 See Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 1. 
 295 For example, although it does not handle privacy complaints, a subcommittee 
of the House of Lords criticized the right to be forgotten as unworkable. See Tyler 
Lopez, U.K. Is Coming Around to Google’s Side on Right to Be Forgotten, SLATE (Aug. 1, 
2014, 3:47 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2014/08/01/u_k_is_coming_ 
around_to_google_s_side_on_the_right_to_be_forgotten.html. 
 296 See EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, DATA PROTECTION IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: THE ROLE OF NATIONAL DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITIES 42 (2010), 
  
2016] Recognizing Rights in Real Time 1069 
relatively the same levels of review, presumably under the same 
standards as interpreted by Google. 
Google’s policy on the right to be forgotten should also be viewed as 
a form of global governance. Google is the world’s most popular 
search engine.297 Google’s policy on its search results and whether 
people can request any changes affects the world. By 2015, Google 
recognized a right to be forgotten only for the 28 EU members and the 
four European Economic Area countries.298 As more countries 
recognize a right to be forgotten, Google may be required to expand its 
coverage; Russia passed a law recognizing the right effective January 
2016.299 Moreover, Google may voluntarily choose to extend a form of 
right to be forgotten for other countries. For example, Google has 
recognized a limited right for victims of revenge porn to request 
removal of links to nude photographs of them that are posted online 
without their consent.300 This policy applies globally to Google.com. 
Whatever policy Google chooses, it affects — and governs — people 
around the world and their online identities. 
B. Functions of Google 
Google’s role as a private administrative agency is manifest in the 
variety of public functions it is serving in enforcing the right to be 
forgotten. It is not surprising that Google describes its own role in 
classic administrative agency terms: “We had to create an 
administrative system to intake the requests and then act on them.”301 
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To put it pithily: Google looks like an agency, talks like an agency, 
and acts like an agency. 
1. Adjudication and Rendering of Decisions 
Google’s most prominent role in the enforcement of the right to be 
forgotten is adjudication. Google is the decision-maker. Google is the 
first and perhaps often the last stage of adjudication to decide which 
requests for removal of a listing on Google’s search engine are 
meritorious. As discussed earlier, the process Google affords is quite 
streamlined and, although challenges may be brought to the national 
Data Protection Authority and courts, relatively few requests for 
removal appear to have proceeded beyond Google’s determination.302 
Although critics have openly attacked the delegation of decision-
making authority to Google,303 such criticisms only confirm that 
Google’s decision-making role is perceived as one involving the kind 
of power associated with government bodies. As Austrian Justice 
Minister Wolfgang Brandstetter remarked, “We can’t leave it up to 
search engines to decide on the right balance between freedom of 
expression and right to be forgotten.”304 Following the decision, a 
group of EU justice ministers expressed the “need to build a public 
jurisdiction that can address this issue.”305 
2. Investigation, Information Gathering, and Enforcement 
Google also serves the important agency roles of information-
gathering and enforcement. Google has collected information related 
to 356,012 requests to remove 1,261,476 RTBF links in a year and a 
half.306 While Google admits that its ability to investigate the facts 
asserted in RTBF claims of individuals is quite limited,307 Google does 
require documentation of the identity of the person asserting the 
 
 302 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 303 See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
 304 Stephanie Bodoni, EU Seeks to Curb Google Control of Right to Be Forgotten, 
BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Oct. 10, 2014, 4:00 PM PDT) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-10/eu-seeks-to-curb-google-control-of-
right-to-be-forgotten. 
 305 Id. (quoting Italian Justice Minister Andrea Orlando) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 306 See Google Transparency Report: European Privacy Requests for Search Removals, 
supra note 20 (results on Dec. 10, 2015). 
 307 See Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 12. 
  
2016] Recognizing Rights in Real Time 1071 
request for removal.308 Moreover, through its Transparency Reports, 
Google shares information related to the RTBF requests it has 
processed, including data related to the total number of requests, 
grants, and rejections of the requests in total and also by country.309 
Google exercises great enforcement power by holding the ultimate 
power to remove the challenged links or not. 
3. Lawmaking: Rules, Interpretations, and Guidance 
Google has exercised a quasi-lawmaking power. Google has 
interpreted the Costeja decision and the EU Data Protection Directive. 
Google’s interpretation is embodied in several places. First, Google’s 
website has a RTBF claim form that explains Google’s understanding 
of the right and the decision.310 Second, Google has explained its 
understanding in greater depth in its reply to the questionnaire from 
the Article 29 Working Party,311 as well as in public statements 
including an article by Chief Legal Officer David Drummond 
published in The Guardian.312 
Third, Google has set up an Advisory Council that hosted seven 
public meetings and that “invited contributions from government, 
business, media, academia, the technology sector, data protection 
organizations and other organizations with a particular interest in the 
area, to identify and discuss the challenging issues at the intersection 
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of the right to information and the right to privacy.”313 Google 
received thousands of comments online.314 Although not quite to the 
level of a notice-and-comment rulemaking, the process included 
aspects of public participation in the formulation of the Council’s 
interpretation. And the end result was a 41-page document that 
reflects the Council’s view of the RTBF, the nature of the right, the 
criteria that should be used to assess RTBF claims, and the procedure 
and scope of enforcement.315 The extraordinary document reads much 
like a public agency’s rulemaking or recommendations.316 Of course, 
the Advisory Council’s view does not have the force of law, and on the 
key issue of the scope of enforcement (Google.com-wide or European-
specific Google services), the Advisory Council’s view conflicts with 
the Article 29 Working Party’s Guidelines.317 But, in terms of 
functioning and practical effect, Google’s and its Advisory Council’s 
views on the RTBF are undoubtedly influential. 
4. Developing Expertise Related to RTBF 
While many in the EU have criticized Google for its handling of 
RTBF requests, Google has developed a certain amount of expertise in 
deciding RTBF simply by virtue of the fact that it has the most 
experience among search engines in deciding such requests — over 
356,000 requests related to 1,261,476 URLs in a little over a year and a 
half.318 Google’s expertise will only grow as it continues to process 
hundreds of thousands of requests each year. 
In sum, Google is operating as a private administrative agency in its 
handling of RTBF claims. The EU’s tacit or informal delegation of 
decision-making authority to Google can be explained as an attempt to 
outsource administrative tasks to a private agency. In its processing of 
 
 313 Google Advisory Council, supra note 16. 
 314 Id. (“That’s why we convened a council of experts to review input from dozens 
of experts in meetings across Europe, as well as from thousands of submissions via the 
Web.”). 
 315 See FLORIDI ET AL., supra note 143. 
 316 Compare id. (the Advisory Council’s report), with Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–.13 (2014) (regulating children’s privacy online), and 
FED. TRADE COMMISSION, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-
protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf 
(calling for privacy and data security legislation). 
 317 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 318 Google Transparency Report: European Privacy Requests for Search Removals, 
supra note 20 (results on Dec. 10, 2015). 
  
2016] Recognizing Rights in Real Time 1073 
RTBF requests, Google performs the kind of important public 
functions that are associated with public regulatory agencies. And 
given the reach of its policy and decisions, Google is engaged in a form 
of global governance over Internet users. It is a global administrative 
agency, with regulatory powers affecting people around the world. 
V. THE TRADEOFFS OF GOOGLE’S ROLE IN THE RTBF 
This Part examines the tradeoffs in delegating Google considerable 
discretion to handle RTBF claims in the EU. While the drawbacks are 
significant and raise serious concerns, the benefits of this arrangement 
are also substantial and may justify outsourcing the processing of 
these claims to Google — subject to some modifications as discussed 
later in Part VI. 
A. Drawbacks 
Giving Google the primary responsibility of deciding the contours of 
the newly recognized right to be forgotten — the standard for which is 
still developing — is an invitation for problems. As this section 
explains, there are numerous drawbacks in delegating to Google this 
important responsibility in protecting a fundamental right in the EU. 
1. Google Staff Are Not Public Officials 
For starters, Google is a profit-making corporation whose overall 
objective is to increase the wealth of its shareholders. While it also has 
other more public-minded goals (e.g., innovate, “don’t be evil,” spread 
knowledge, and philanthropy through its nonprofit arms),319 Google is 
a business whose overall goal is to make money — which it has done 
quite well.320 Relatedly, Google’s employees are not public officials. 
Google’s employees cannot be held accountable by the public in same 
way as public officials (e.g., civil servants, judges, or legislators) 
can.321 Indeed, the public might not even be able to determine the 
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identities of most of Google’s employees, including the ones who 
process RTBF claims. Google does not publish a list of its employees 
who are handling RTBF claims, much less their background and 
expertise. They are all anonymous. 
Another concern is the lack of diversity among Google employees — 
a concern that could exist with other entities and government.322 
Google has greater gender diversity in its nontechnical positions 
compared to technical positions, even non-engineering positions have 
only 3% African Americans and 4% Hispanics in the United States.323 
Google has not released data on the ethnicity composition of its 
employees outside the United States. Although most of the RTBF staff 
are reportedly located in Dublin, it is not clear if Google employees 
outside of Europe are also involved.324 
2. Google’s Possible Bias in Favor of Access to Information 
The use of Google employees to process RTBF claims filed with 
Google raises questions about the training and competence of the 
employees assigned to process the claims. As mentioned above, 
Google has not released information related to the background of 
those employees assigned to process the RTBF claims. While it is 
possible some of Google’s employees have extensive knowledge of EU 
privacy law, one might conjecture that the employees at the national 
Data Protection Authorities have greater knowledge of EU privacy law, 
on average, given the DPA’s primary mission to implement and protect 
the EU data privacy rights.325 Relatedly, Google employees may have 
an institutional bias that is more skeptical of the RTBF claims. Google 
has publicly stated that it disagrees with the Costeja decision, even 
while acknowledging that it will implement the decision.326 Back in 
2011, writing on his personal blog and not in his capacity as Google’s 
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General Privacy Counsel, Peter Fleischer expressed concern that 
privacy claims could be used as a form of censorship.327 More 
generally, Google has a longstanding belief in the sharing of 
knowledge and access to information, so the RTBF may run counter to 
its ideals.328 As its own website hails, “Google’s mission is to organize 
the world’s information and make it universally accessible and 
useful.”329 Numerous critics in the EU have already called into 
question Google’s commitment to protecting the RTBF.330 
However, after reviewing over 200,000 requests in nine months of 
its implementation of the RTBF, Google struck a more conciliatory 
note and appeared to be more open to the possibility there may be a 
legitimate need to protect people’s RTBF.331 Peter Barron, Google’s 
European communications director, conceded: “We certainly accept 
that there is an issue to be addressed. For us, the whole process has 
been an exercise in learning and listening and, as [Google co-founder 
and CEO] Larry Page has said, to try to see things from a more 
European perspective.”332 In 2015, Google search chief Amit Singhal 
even stated that teenagers in the United States should have a right to 
be forgotten for some of their youthful indiscretions.333 Nonetheless, 
Google comes to the issue with a stated preference for universal 
accessibility of content online. 
3. Minimal Due Process Afforded by Google 
Another potential problem is the minimal due process afforded by 
Google to a claimant. However, it should be noted that the process 
afforded by national Data Protection Authorities is also typically 
modest, so concern in this area might be reason to reform the entire 
process of administration.334 
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a. Streamlined Ex Parte Process with No Hearing 
Google does not afford a hearing or oral argument to individual 
claimants. The individual requests for delisting and Google’s decisions 
are handled by exchange of written notices electronically.335 If Google 
has questions about the submission, it may request more information, 
again through electronic transmission.336 The process is conducted ex 
parte, with only the claimant or claimant’s representative able to make 
requests to Google.337 Third parties and members of the public who 
may have an interest in the information are not able to make 
submissions to Google.338 Of course, the nature of the right to be 
forgotten is a personal privacy right, so disclosure to third parties may 
frustrate the exercise of that right. Google does inform the webmaster 
whose page has been delisted after Google has made its decision, but 
without reference to the claimant.339 In such cases, the webmaster or 
publisher of the delisted content may ask Google for 
reconsideration.340 One benefit of the streamlined process is that 
Google is able to respond very quickly (within 1 to 6 days) to a 
person’s request.341 
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 337 See Search Removal Request Under Data Protection Law in Europe, supra note 17; see 
also Eric Goldman, Primer on European Union’s Right to Be Forgotten (Excerpt from My 
Internet Law Casebook) + Bonus Linkwrap, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Aug. 21, 2014), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2014/08/primer-on-european-unions-right-to-be-
forgotten-excerpt-from-my-internet-law-casebook-bonus-linkwrap.htm (“[G]oogle will 
make its decisions on an ex parte basis, based solely on representations by requesting 
individuals.”). 
 338 See Search Removal Request Under Data Protection Law in Europe, supra note 17 
(requiring that only “the person affected by the web pages identified,” or a legally 
authorized representatives of an affected person, may make submissions to Google). See 
generally Loek Essers, This Is How Google Handles ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Requests, 
COMPUTERWORLD (Nov. 19, 2014, 12:54 PM PT), http://www.computerworld.com/ 
article/2849686/this-is-how-google-handles-right-to-be-forgotten-requests.html (describing 
the system Google has implemented to accommodate the “right to be forgotten”). 
 339 Essers, supra note 338. 
 340 See Letter from Peter Fleischer to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, supra note 22, at 6. 
 341 See, e.g., E-mail from Subject 1 to Author (Feb. 17, 2015, 1:39 PM CT) (on file 
with author) (notifying decision within approximately twenty-four hours); E-mail 
from Subject 2 to Author (Apr. 12, 2015, 5:00 GMT) (on file with author) (notifying 
decision within six days). 
  
2016] Recognizing Rights in Real Time 1077 
b. Decision Notice Has Modest Explanation 
Google notifies each claimant of Google’s decision by email.342 The 
decision includes the reason for the decision.343 If the request is 
accepted, Google simply notifies the person that “[a]ccording to your 
request Google Inc. takes appropriate measures to block the following 
URLs in the European versions of the Google search results for search 
queries related to your name . . . .”344 For rejections, Google provides a 
little more explanation. Based on my interviews with two individuals 
who received rejections, Google provided them with a one-paragraph 
explanation of the general reason for the rejection; the reason given 
appeared to be cut and paste from a standard response composed by 
Google for that type of rejection (matters relating to professional 
work).345 
c. No Formal Rehearing or Appeal by Claimant Within Google 
From public accounts of its procedure, Google does not appear to 
offer a claimant whose claim has been rejected a formal opportunity 
for a rehearing or appeal within Google. Once Google has made its 
decision and notified the claimant, the process within Google is done 
for the claimant.346 Based on my interview of a person who received a 
rejection, Google responded to an email sent by the claimant about 
Google’s decision, but Google just repeated its original decision in 
response.347 As the rejection notice of Google indicates, if the claimant 
wants to appeal Google’s decision, the claimant must pursue the 
dispute with the national data protection authority or with the 
webmaster of the website containing the information.348 By contrast, 
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Google does reconsider a removal of a link if the webmaster or 
publisher of the content whose link has been removed requests it.349 In 
some cases, Google has reinstated the link based on a second review of 
the RTBF claim.350 
4. Errors of Law 
Given the combination of factors mentioned above, plus the 
minimal guidance provided by the Costeja decision, Google seems 
bound to make some mistakes. Even a public agency or court would. 
Part of the reason is that the law regarding the right to be forgotten is 
still developing. Even though the Working Party later came out with 
guidelines of its own and the EU may adopt new standards in the 
proposed General Data Protection Regulation, these developments 
only underscore how unsettled the precise contours of the RTBF is.351 
Moreover, because the RTBF must be decided on a case-by-case basis 
with a balancing of private and public interests, the determination of 
RTBF claims may spark differences in viewpoints on what the correct 
balance is in a particular case. Besides the inherent difficulties of 
applying a balancing test on a case-by-case basis with consistency, 
Google’s particular situation and process may create a greater 
likelihood of error. As discussed above, Google itself has no prior 
expertise in this area of EU privacy law, a possible institutional bias in 
favor of access to information, and a highly streamlined process to 
handle RTBF claims.352 Even while acting in good faith, Google might 
decide close cases in favor of access to information given its corporate 
mission, in a way that national Data Protection Authorities and courts 
might disagree with. Further errors might result from Google’s 
streamlined process with not enough information or opportunity for 
an individual to prosecute or appeal her claim with Google. 
B. Benefits 
Although the disadvantages of Google’s processing of RTBF claims 
appear to be substantial, the benefits may also be significant and 
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provide some justification for the EU’s delegation of power to Google 
to serve as a decision-maker. 
1. Bigger Budget and More Staff 
First, Google has at its disposal considerable resources. As 
mentioned above, Google has a market capitalization of $365.46 
billion and a staff of 46,170 employees worldwide.353 Its profits for the 
last quarter of 2014 were $4.76 billion, up nearly 30% from the same 
period in 2013.354 By contrast, Data Protection Authorities in EU 
countries have comparatively modest budgets. For example, the UK 
DPA had a budget of nearly £20 million, while Ireland had 
approximately £1.2 million in 2014.355 According to a 2010 report, a 
number of EU countries (e.g., Austria, Italy, Romania, France, and 
Portugal) did not have adequate funding for their DPAs.356 The report 
concluded: “[T]he absence of sufficient human and financial resources 
represents a significant challenge to the effectiveness of the national 
supervisory systems that might jeopardize the protection of the 
fundamental rights of data subjects.”357 
Given the clear advantage in financial resources and staff that 
Google enjoys, delegating the lion’s share of administration of RTBF 
claims to Google makes considerable sense. With such resources, 
Google set up the infrastructure, staffing, and webform within weeks 
of the Costeja decision. After an initial backlog of RTBF requests, 
Google appears to be processing the requests with efficiency. By 
December 10, 2015, Google had evaluated 356,012 requests and 
1,261,476 URLs for removal, and granted removals with respect to 
42.1% of the URLs.358 Google processed, on average, over 19,770 
claims per month — which translates into approximately 650 
decisions a day. Two individuals whom I interviewed received their 
responses from Google within 1 and 6 days, respectively.359 
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2. Experience in Notice-and-Takedown to Handle Expeditiously 
Large Number of Requests 
Google already has decades of experience handling a high volume of 
copyright notices under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA”) and comparable ISP safe harbors in other countries. Under 
the DMCA safe harbor, a copyright owner can send a so-called DMCA 
notice to an ISP to request the removal of allegedly infringing material 
either linked to or hosted by the ISP.360 The volume of copyright 
notices Google receives for its sites (including Google and YouTube) 
is much higher than the number of RTBF claims. For example, Google 
received copyright notices to remove 8,107,272 URLs in just one week 
(of February 9, 2015) — meaning more than a million URLs in one 
day on average.361 By one estimate, “Google is currently asked to 
remove an infringing search result every 8 milliseconds, compared to 
one request per six days back in 2008.”362 The ISP’s review of such 
copyright notices is even more modest: ISPs must expeditiously take 
down the allegedly infringing material in order to fall within the safe 
harbor.363 Presumably, Google is using an automated system to handle 
such a high volume of copyright notices and then relying upon the 
party whose link has been removed to file a counter-notice with 
Google to challenge the copyright notice. Google has also instituted a 
Content ID system for copyright owners to digitally tag their content 
on YouTube, so it can detect unauthorized copies of their content.364 
Although both copyright owners and users of content have criticized 
the notice-and-takedown process, it has become a major feature of the 
online ecosystem for ISPs and copyright owners. For our purposes, it 
shows Google’s ability to process a high volume of requests in an 
efficient manner. In its fact sheet on the right to be forgotten, the EU 
Commission cited Google’s handling of copyright notices as evidence 
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that Google can handle a high volume of RTBF claims.365 Of course, 
RTBF claims are different from copyright notices in that RTBF claims 
require human review of the claims, as well as more analysis of the law 
and the facts asserted than the typical copyright notice. However, 
Google’s demonstrated ability to adapt to large volumes of compliance 
issues in the copyright arena provides at least some basis to predict that 
Google can handle the administrative burden of processing RTBF claims. 
3. Better at Analytics 
Google also is good at analytics. Google’s search itself is a 
technology based on analytics — its algorithm identifies relevant 
search results based on identifying websites with more links from 
other websites.366 Google offers analytics tools for websites to study 
and improve traffic to their sites, as well as to target their ads.367 In 
addition, Google issues transparency reports summarizing data related 
to a variety of topics, including government censorship requests, 
copyright notices, RTBF requests, user requests for information, 
Google product traffic, encryption of email, and detected malware.368 
At least for the RTBF claims, the information is updated in real time as 
Google decides the claims. Although national Data Protection 
Authorities might have some experts in analytics and statistics as well, 
it is hard to imagine that the number of experts plus technical know-
how could rival Google’s. As Eric Schmidt and Jonathan Rosenberg 
describe in their book How Google Works, Google’s success derives 
largely from its ability to find a strong technical insight to a 
problem.369 Perhaps Google can utilize some form of analytics to the 
RTBF issue, for example, by identifying recurring traits of the 
successful versus unsuccessful RTBF claims and publishing guidelines 
for people in the EU. 
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4. More Efficient than Government Agency 
Google may have an advantage in being a Fortune 500 company that 
is often considered to be one of the most innovative in the world.370 
Google’s success in the business and tech world provides some evidence 
that Google can handle demanding tasks with sufficient resources, 
efficiency, and organization.371 By contrast, some Data Protection 
Authorities are notorious for lack of funding, resources, and power.372 
According to the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, “In many Member 
States, DPAs are not in a position to carry out the entirety of their tasks 
because of the limited economic and human resources available to 
them.”373 Or, as some critics in the EU have put it, “Most of Europe’s 31 
national data protection authorities are cumbersome, under-resourced 
bureaucracies issuing occasional, random fines and reacting when a 
court occasionally clarifies the law.”374 
5. Experimentation and Making Legal Mistakes 
Another virtue of having a private administrative agency in charge of 
processing RTBF claims is the flexibility that a nongovernmental actor 
may enjoy in experimentation and even in making mistakes. Even EU 
policymakers and national governments in the EU are still figuring out 
the precise contours of the RTBF.375 If the national DPAs in 28 EU 
countries were responsible for deciding all RTBF claims, conflicting 
decisions could result in at least some of the 28 countries.376 The 
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public’s confidence in the RTBF could be undermined if the 28 DPAs 
openly disagree on basic aspects of the RTBF. But having Google go first 
avoids that problem. Google becomes, in effect, the guinea pig to figure 
out and develop the RTBF. And, if Google gets it wrong, the public’s 
confidence in the right will not be shaken if EU authorities correct the 
errors and provide, over time, a better understanding of the right. 
VI. TOWARD A NEW MODEL OF THE HYBRID ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY 
This final Part proposes a new model of a hybrid administrative 
agency. The hybrid agency would not displace any current private or 
public administrative agencies. Instead, it would serve as a bridge 
between the two. This arrangement would make the private 
administrative agency more democratically accountable while not 
sacrificing the efficiencies and other advantages that such private 
entities offer. 
A. Theory: Public-Private Partnerships in the Administrative State 
The proposed hybrid agency draws upon the rich literature 
discussing theories related to public-private partnerships (“PPP”).377 
PPP is a term used loosely to describe joint relationships between 
government and private actors to deliver services to the public related 
to health, security, or typically other social goods.378 The PPP 
approach is meant to be collaborative and to break down the 
traditional limited view of the separate roles of “public” and “private” 
actors.379 As Professor Freeman explains, “A collaborative regime 
challenges existing assumptions about what constitutes public or 
private roles in governance because the most collaborative 
arrangements will often involve sharing responsibilities and mutual 
accountability that crosses the public-private divide.”380 In short, “the 
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overarching goal of all PPPs is to capitalize on the private sector’s 
management skills, expertise, innovations, efficiencies, and alternative 
methods of funding.”381 
Collaborative PPP theory thus aims at a new model of interaction 
between public and private actors. The delineation between public and 
private actor disappears in favor of collaboration among various 
stakeholders or contributors from different sectors, all of whom can 
contribute to and benefit from the cooperative process.382 Getting each 
contributor invested in the process — as an equal participant with 
equal responsibility — may help to improve the working relationships 
among the group and to overcome hardened, adversarial positions 
between the regulators and the regulated. For example, at a speech in 
Silicon Valley among leading tech companies, President Obama 
offered a proposal to combat cyberattacks and to increase 
cybersecurity by creating data hubs in which government and private 
entities share information about cyberthreats.383 While some tech 
companies were still wary of the government’s overture following the 
revelations of the National Security Agency’s (“NSA”) secret 
surveillance program and its threat to privacy,384 the President’s 
proposal at least represented a much more cooperative relationship 
than the covert NSA program. 
PPP theory prizes experimentalism and flexibility. Put simply, 
“errors are not viewed as failures.”385 Many tasks that agencies face are 
difficult and complex. Yet failures and setbacks of the government 
often become fodder for media ridicule as well as the subject of 
partisan politics. The fiasco over the Obama Administration’s 
HealthCare.gov website, which could not adequately handle 
enrollments to the Obamacare plan on the date of its rollout, is a case 
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in point. The website was constructed by 33 companies, but the 
government failed to designate clearly a coordinator and overseer to 
ensure all of the work of the various companies would be 
integrated.386 To resolve the problem, the Obama administration 
brought in engineers from leading U.S. tech companies Google, 
Oracle, and Redhat in a so-called tech surge.387 The integration of the 
tech experts from private industry into the oversight role was a more 
advanced form of PPP relationship than the original government 
contractor model that started the creation of the website. In five 
months, many of the problems with the website were fixed.388 Even if 
the problems had remained, one might speculate that the public would 
have been accepting of problems related to the launch of a website of 
that scale if the tech experts from Google, Oracle, and Redhat could 
not resolve the problems right away. In terms of perception, it was no 
longer the government and contractors working on the website. It was 
representatives of Google, Oracle, and Redhat working with the 
government on the website. 
As suggested above, the Internet may be conducive to PPP 
relationships given the way in which the Internet developed under a 
laissez faire approach that is skeptical of government intrusiveness. 
Also, Internet companies often wield immense power (perhaps equal 
to the power exercised by governments) over individuals in terms of 
their privacy, freedom of expression, and surveillance in ways that are 
not always immediately recognized by people. Using a PPP in the 
Internet context can be less threatening than direct government 
regulation, while at the same time it can create greater transparency of 
the powers that Internet companies already exercise over their users in 
terms of their individual freedoms. 
B. The New Model of Hybrid Administrative Agency 
This section proposes a way to structure (i) new procedures for 
search engines to process RTBF claims in the EU and (ii) a new model 
 
 386 See Louise Radnofsky, Poor Oversight, Work Marred Health Site’s Launch, Report 
Says, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20, 2015, 2:27 PM ET), http://www.wsj.com/articles/report-
finds-flawed-process-in-awarding-healthcare-gov-website-contracts-1421781115. 
 387 See Brett LoGiurato, Desperate Government Hires Google and Oracle Experts to 
Fix the Obamacare Website, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 31, 2013, 2:57 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/obamacare-website-healthcare-gov-google-oracle-red-
hat-2013-10. 
 388 See Steve Contorno, Is Healthcare.gov Working ‘Great’ Now?, POLITIFACT (Mar. 
14, 2014, 3:50 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2014/mar/14/ 
healthcaregov-working-great-now/. 
  
1086 University of California, Davis [Vol. 49:1017 
of a hybrid administrative agency that fosters greater cooperation, 
dialogue, transparency, and accountability among private and public 
actors alike. The features of this proposed hybrid administrative 
agency are offered as an example of how a more flexible approach 
might be constructed. The proposal is not meant as the sole or 
exclusive way of designing a hybrid administrative agency. Nor is it 
meant as a panacea for the problems of democratic accountability 
inherent in any delegation of authority to private actors. Instead, the 
proposal is meant as a blueprint to consider and springboard for future 
discussion. 
1. Standardized RTBF Form for Search Engines and the Third-
Pair-of-Eyes Review 
The first part of the proposal is for the EU to create a standardized 
online webform for individuals to make one RTBF request that could, 
upon the individual’s election, go automatically to Google, Bing, and 
Yahoo! for review. Other search engines could be included as well, 
but, in October 2014, Google had nearly 93% market share for search 
in Europe, followed by Bing at 2.67% and Yahoo! at 2.34%.389 
Currently, each search engine has its own webform, and individuals 
must file a separate request with each company.390 With a 
standardized RTBF form that applies to the three major search engines 
in the EU, an individual can reduce the time and hassle of filing 
separate requests with three or more different forms.391 The form 
would be available through the website of the hybrid agency that will 
oversee its processing and administration (discussed later below). If 
the claimant selects to have the form sent to all three companies, the 
completed form will be automatically sent, along with accompanying 
documents, to each search engine, as depicted in Figure 2 below. 
 
 
 389 See Rosoff, Google in Europe, supra note 80. 
 390 E.g., Request to Block Bing Search Results in Europe, BING, 
https://www.bing.com/webmaster/tools/eu-privacy-request (last visited Feb. 20, 2015); 
Requests to Block Search Results in Yahoo Search: Resource for European Residents, 
YAHOO! HELP, https://uk.help.yahoo.com/kb/SLN24378.html (last visited Sept. 27, 
2015) (scroll down mid-page, and click “online form” hyperlink); Search Removal 
Request Under Data Protection Law in Europe, supra note 17. 
 391 The uniform applications for international patent and trademark filings have 
created efficiencies for intellectual property owners seeking international protection. 
See Edward Lee, The Global Trade Mark, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 917, 930 (2014). 
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Figure 2. Third-Pair-of-Eyes Review and Hybrid Agency Appeals 
 
Moreover, having all three search engines review the same RTBF 
request has the advantage of subjecting each claim to a second and 
third pair of eyes, albeit independent eyes at different companies. 
Empirical studies of the “second pair of eyes” (“SPER”) review of 
patent applications by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office suggest 
that it may have helped to improve the examination of the 
applications.392 As depicted in Figure 2 above, under the proposed 
“third pair of eyes” review, Google, Bing, and Yahoo! would each 
decide the RTBF request independently of each other, but their 
decisions would be collected by the hybrid agency for review, as 
discussed next. 
2. The New RTBF Hybrid Agency as an Oversight Body 
The second part of the proposal is to create a new hybrid 
administrative agency to help provide both (i) greater oversight over 
the search engines deciding RTBF claims and (ii) greater collaboration 
 
 392 See Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 
EMORY L.J. 181, 201-02 (2008) (“One possible explanation for the low grant rate in 
this class is that the second pair of eyes is working, and that the grant rate reflects 
better rigor during examinations, rather than application volume.”). 
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among public and private actors in determining RTBF claims. One of 
the limitations of the current structure is that the public officials of the 
EU, such as in the Article 29 Working Party, are operating separately 
from the decision-makers of Google and the other search engines as 
these private actors are developing the RTBF on their own.393 
Although there has been some dialogue between the two sides, this 
siloed approach breeds an adversarial and hierarchical mode of 
communication between public and private actors — the public 
officials attempt to tell Google and other search engines what to do in 
a top-down approach, while the search engines have to perform most 
of the legwork. If the public and private actors disagree on the 
contours of the RTBF, there is no formal process — other than 
litigation — by which the two sides can resolve their differences. 
a. Seven Commissioners of the RTBF Agency 
A hybrid agency can transform this hierarchical, adversarial 
relationship between the EU and search engines by establishing a 
forum in which the two sides can resolve their differences in a joint 
partnership. The hybrid agency would consist of seven 
Commissioners: three representatives designated by Google, Bing, and 
Yahoo!, three public officials appointed by an EU government body 
(such as the EU Commission), and one public official selected by 
popular vote in the EU. Each of the three corporations would be asked 
to contribute a portion of the funding of the hybrid agency, along with 
a portion of public funds committed from the EU. The Commissioners 
would decide how to allocate the funds for office space, staff, and 
other needs. 
b. The Appellate Body: Public Oversight and Review of RTBF 
Decisions by Search Engines 
The hybrid agency’s main charge would be to provide oversight and 
review of the RTBF decisions by Google, Bing, and Yahoo!, in order to 
develop the RTBF in a consistent or acceptable manner, balancing the 
competing interests related to the claims. The agency would receive all 
RTBF decisions by search engines through encrypted digital files with 
the names of the applicants redacted or anonymized. Google’s own 
publication of twenty-three anonymized examples of RTBF decisions it 
 
 393 See generally Member of the Article 29 Working Party, EUROPEAN COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/structure/members/index_en.htm 
(last visited Aug. 21, 2015) (explaining the structure of the Article 29 Working Party 
comprised of government officials). 
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has made shows that search engines can summarize and then publish 
their decisions without revealing the identity of the people who made 
the requests.394 The collection of the RTBF decisions would be helpful 
for two important goals. 
The first goal would be to reduce conflicting decisions among the 
three search engines. A conflict would be created if the ultimate 
decision (reject or accept the request) is different among the search 
engines. If an individual received inconsistent decisions from the three 
search engines, the individual would be entitled to an automatic 
appeal at her election. The person could decide to accept an 
inconsistent result (with a link delisted on some search engines, but 
not others). If the claimant elects to have an appeal, the agency would 
act as the Appellate Body with three Commissioners hearing the 
appeal (one randomly selected from the search engine Commissioners, 
one from the EU government Commissioners, and the publicly elected 
Commissioner). 
The level of process afforded for the appeal could be tailored to the 
degree of complexity of the appeal. The individual applicant would be 
afforded an opportunity to submit a brief explaining his or her 
request, but the applicant could also choose to rely upon its original 
request submitted on the standardized form. The hybrid agency might 
also designate a public advocate to present the arguments on the 
public’s behalf. At its discretion, the hybrid agency could hold a 
(closed) hearing giving the individual or her attorney an opportunity 
for oral argument either in person or by video conference. The three 
Commissioners would then decide the appeal by majority vote and 
render a written opinion to the appellant. The decisions of the 
Appellate Body would be anonymized so that no personal identifying 
features of the appellant or the source of the web page would be 
included. The anonymized decisions would be published so the public 
would have a better understanding of what the RTBF entails. 
c. Data Analytics, Transparency, and Accountability 
The hybrid agency would also conduct internal audits of all the 
RTBF decisions made by search engines, as well as the Appellate 
Body’s decisions. Using data analytics, the hybrid agency would 
attempt to identify any common characteristics of all the decisions 
rendered in favor of the claimant versus those decisions rejecting the 
claims. From the data, the agency would attempt to compile more 
 
 394 See Google Transparency Report: European Privacy Requests for Search Removals, 
supra note 20. 
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detailed guidelines on the factors that make a RTBF claim more or less 
successful. The hybrid agency would issue an annual Transparency 
Report providing information on the number of RTBF requests, the 
decisions made by each search engine, and the decisions of the 
Appellate Body. The precise scope of information to be published will 
need to be left for further debate and deliberation. The call by eighty 
professors for Google to release more data on its RTBF decisions 
provides a good starting point for discussion.395 
d. Relationship to Existing EU Bodies 
The hybrid agency would not have exclusive jurisdiction over 
administrative appeals of decisions created by conflicts among the search 
engines. The administrative appeals would be offered as an alternative 
dispute resolution similar to how World Intellectual Property 
Organization (“WIPO”) panels decide UDRP complaints involving 
domain name disputes.396 The WIPO panel decisions are not binding on 
courts and do not extinguish the parties’ right to pursue litigation in 
court. Likewise, the decisions of the Appellate Body would not be entitled 
to any deference in national courts or data protection authorities, should 
an individual wish to pursue a complaint in those fora. 
C. Advantages of the Hybrid RTBF Agency 
The proposed hybrid administrative agency offers several advantages 
over the public agency and private agency models. However, the 
hybrid agency is not meant to supplant either public or private 
agencies. The administrative state in the twenty-first century thus 
becomes a mixture of public, private, and hybrid agencies, each 
performing specific roles. 
 
 395 Ellen Goodman, In Open Letter to Google, 80 Technology Scholars Press for More 
Transparency on Right to Be Forgotten Compliance, MEDIA POL’Y PROJECT BLOG (May 14, 
2015), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2015/05/14/in-open-letter-to-google-80-
technology-scholars-press-for-more-transparency-on-right-to-be-forgotten-compliance/. 
 396 See List of Approved Dispute Resolution Providers, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/ 
resources/pages/providers-6d-2012-02-25-en (last visited Nov. 14, 2015); WIPO Guide to 
the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/guide/#e1 (last visited Oct. 30, 2015) (scroll down to 
“Role of the Administrative Panel”). 
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1. Synergies Between the Private/Public Worlds While Leaving 
Existing Agencies Intact 
The hybrid agency offers a way to harness the benefits of both 
traditional public agencies and increasingly common private agencies. 
It does so without supplanting either kind of agency. Instead, it serves 
as a bridge between the two kinds of agencies in an area where the 
input of both public officials and private actors is needed. In this way, 
the hybrid agency does not interfere with the internal decision-making 
of either public or private agencies. The efficiencies gained by private 
agencies administering RTBF claims are preserved, as are the 
important public functions and services of public agencies. But the 
hybrid agency offers a way to create synergies between public and 
private actors by bringing them together in a common institution with 
a common task. 
For example, the proposed hybrid agency does not interfere with 
how Google or other search engines have designed their internal 
process to decide RTBF claims. While any number of reforms could be 
entertained — such as requiring greater due process and reason-giving 
from the search engines — such reforms may well be intrusive and 
counterproductive, sacrificing the efficiencies of private administrative 
agencies and turning them into a more cumbersome quasi-public 
agency. Likewise, the proposed hybrid agency does not displace the 
EU government institutions, national Data Protection Authorities, or 
the courts. These institutions continue to play important roles in the 
development of the RTBF. Claimants can still appeal any decision by 
search engines to national DPAs and eventually the courts. The 
Appellate Body of the hybrid agency would provide an alternative 
forum in which claimants can seek an initial appeal of the search 
engines’ decisions if there is a conflict in the results. 
2. Oversight, Consistency, and Accountability 
By providing a third-pair-of-eyes review and a right of 
administrative appeal of conflicting decisions among the search 
engines, this proposal offers a way to introduce greater oversight over 
how RTBF claims are processed. The proposal creates a dual 
mechanism that is designed to increase consistency among the search 
engines in processing RTBF claims. Moreover, through the hybrid 
agency’s publication of the annual Transparency Report and 
anonymized decisions of the Appellate Body, the agency will increase 
the level of public accountability. The changes mark a dramatic 
improvement over the status quo in which there is no standard form 
  
1092 University of California, Davis [Vol. 49:1017 
to make RTBF claims, much less an institutional way to track and 
resolve conflicts among search engines. 
3. Hybrid Administrative Agency May Be Less Subject to Industry 
Capture 
The diverse composition of the hybrid agency may make it less 
subject to capture by the industry. By giving industry representatives a 
seat at the table within the hybrid agency, the institutional design of 
the agency reduces the need for backdoor dealings.397 How industry 
representatives interact with government officials becomes more 
transparent. Many of their interactions would be open to public view 
at proceedings of the hybrid agency. Moreover, having a multimember 
commission is often considered to be less susceptible to capture than a 
single agency head for the simple reason that it is easier to capture one 
person as opposed to several people.398 
The three representatives of the EU government are less likely to 
cater to the search engine industry view. At least thus far, various 
representatives of the EU and other governments have been quite 
critical of how Google has implemented the RTBF.399 Perhaps the 
relationship has been too antagonistic, but it hardly suggests that 
government officials would cater to Google’s limited view of the RTBF. 
Moreover, the EU government would have the responsibility of 
deciding how the three government representatives would be selected, 
so the government could make it a priority to select representatives 
who would not cave in to the industry view, but would represent the 
public’s interest.400 The EU government could also place temporary 
employment restrictions on the government representatives who 
served on the hybrid agency, in order to avoid the “revolving door” 
problem of government officials moving over to lucrative positions in 
the same industry they regulated.401 
 
 397 See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through 
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 42-64 (2010) (examining “equalizing factors” 
that can be included in institutional design of agencies to help avoid capture). 
 398 Id. at 37-38. 
 399 See, e.g., supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text (citing government officials’ 
displeasure).  
 400 See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Remarks, Explaining and Curbing Capture, in 
18 N.C. BANKING INST. 17, 23 (2013) (“You could think about who you want to have 
work at the agencies in the first place to try to break up that agency culture of capture 
just a little bit.”). 
 401 Cf. id. at 18-19, 23 (discussing potential issues for revolving door situations in 
the banking industry). 
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The same “revolving door” employment restriction could apply to 
the public representative, who might be more sympathetic than the 
government officials to the views of the search engines. But the public 
representative is elected and democratically accountable to the people, 
so if the public representative believed that supporting the industry 
view was in the best interest of the public, that would not be a form of 
capture. It would be the public representative doing her job. If the 
public disagrees with the representative’s performance (e.g., as being 
too sympathetic to the industry), people can decline to re-elect the 
representative for a second term. 
The partial funding of the hybrid agency by the search engines 
might enable them to exert influence over the agency.402 What if 
Google threatened not to fund the agency in protest of how the agency 
was deciding appeals? One way to avoid such a problem would be to 
have the agency entirely publicly funded. However, besides being 
expensive, public funding minimizes the level of commitment of the 
search engines in the hybrid agency in ways that may be even more 
counterproductive. Without financial “buy in” from Google and the 
other search engines, the search engines may be less prone to consider 
the agency a joint partnership of their own. A better solution may be 
to preserve the partial private funding of the agency, but have the 
agency obtain commitments from the participating search engines that 
subjects them to financial and other penalties if they threaten to pull 
their funding for political reasons. 
While industry capture is always a concern with any agency, in this 
context it may be less so. The search industry is not like some other 
industries that are dominated by several big players. Given Google’s 
dominance in the search market in the EU, the other search engines 
such as Bing and Yahoo! may not necessarily agree with Google. An 
enterprising search engine could take positions that are competitive 
with Google (e.g., more privacy protective) in an attempt to compete 
in the search engine market in the EU.403 
 
 402 Cf. id. at 22-23 (discussing problems to independence that may arise when 
agency funding comes from federal budget, creating an agency incentive to placate 
Congress). 
 403 Google is a dominant search engine worldwide, but it is not inconceivable for 
another search engine to gain market share. In Russia, the search engine Yandex has a 
significant market share (38%), with Google at 53%, according to Statcounter — 
although Liveinternet.ru has different figures, with Yandex having a majority of 
market share in Russia. See A Closer Look at Yandex’s Market Share in Russia, 
ICROSSING (April 2, 2015), http://connect.icrossing.co.uk/a-closer-look-at-yandexs-
market-share-in-russia_12575. Yandex opposes the upcoming Russian right to be 
forgotten, however. See Ilya Khrennikov, Yandex Protests Russian ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ 
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The final thing to bear in mind is that the hybrid agency has limited 
powers and limited jurisdiction in a field of regulation that has many 
other players, including national courts and data protection 
authorities, the Article 29 Working Party, and other government 
entities. Thus, any “capture” of the hybrid agency would not be as 
harmful as the capture of a government agency that has the sole 
administrative power as regulator in a certain field. 
So what’s in it for Google? Why would it agree to greater oversight? 
It would do so because the proposal is a better alternative for Google 
than the current structure. Google has no seat at the table in the 
Article 29 Working Party or other EU policymaking institution. From 
the EU’s perspective, Google is the regulated, not a regulator. By 
contrast, the hybrid agency formally includes Google in the 
institutional process of developing the right to be forgotten on the 
same level as the EU officials. Moreover, by including Bing and Yahoo! 
in the process, Google can deflect — or share — some of the blame 
and criticism of how it has implemented the RTBF. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article analyzes the prominent role Google is playing in the 
development of the right to be forgotten in the EU. Drawing on the 
theories of Weber and Coase, the Article conceptualizes Google’s role 
as a private administrative agency with quasi-lawmaking, quasi-
adjudicative, and quasi-enforcement powers. The central insight of my 
theory of the private administrative agency is that corporations may 
operate in a quasi-governmental, regulatory capacity in administering 
public rights on a global scale. Such is the case with Google. While 
Google’s role raises concerns of democratic accountability, it also 
yields significant advantages in resources, efficiency, analytics, and 
flexibility that a public agency would not possess. In order to preserve 
these advantages, the Article proposes to keep intact much of Google’s 
independent decision-making in processing RTBF claims. But the 
Article calls for the creation of a hybrid agency (consisting of industry, 
government, and democratically elected representatives) to provide 
greater oversight to the entire process. The oversight agency will 
create a standard RTBF form for people to use with all search engines 
and will institute an administrative appellate body to resolve conflicts 
among the search engines over the same RTBF claim in the EU. The 
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proposed oversight agency represents a form of public-private 
partnership and global governance, designed to increase democratic 
accountability and transparency in Google’s implementation of the 
right to be forgotten. 
